Global Tools Review

Interim Gap Analysis

Final Report

November 2015

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRICSAMIT	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey
CAR	Central African Republic
CBPF	Country Based Pool Funds
CHS	Common Humanitarian Standard
DCM	Disaster and Crisis Management Department
DM	Disaster management
DMIS	Disaster Management Information System
DMWG	Disaster Management Working Group
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DREF	Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
EA	Emergency Appeal
ECHO	European Commission Office of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EPOA	Emergency Plan of Action
ERAT	Emergency Rapid Assessment Teams
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
EU	European Union
FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Team
FERST	Federation Early Recovery Surge Team
GRT	Global Response Tool
GTR	Global tools review
GSWG	Global Surge Working Group
HEOps	Head of Emergency Operations
HES	Household Economic Security
HQ	Headquarters
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies[1]
IM	Information Management
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
MSF	*Medecins sans Frontières*
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NDRT	National Disaster Response Team
NIT	National Intervention Team
NS	National Society
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPT	Occupied Palestinian territory
P&Rs	Principles and Rules of Humanitarian Assistance
PNS	Participating or Partner National Society (i.e. NS when donating response assistance)
RCM	Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (more usually called the Movement)
RDM	ICRC Rapid Deployment Mechanism
RDRT	Regional Disaster Response Team
RRU	Regional Response Unit
RTE	Real-Time Evaluation
SC	Save the Children
SCT	Shelter Coordination Team
SIMS	Surge Information Management System
SMCC	Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation
SOP	Standard operating procedures
STT	Shelter Technical Team
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
USAR	Urban Search and Rescue
WFP	World Food Programme
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit

[1] In this report, IFRC refers to the Secretariat (Geneva HQ, regions, local offices)

1. Executive Summary

This report represents the first phase outcomes of an holistic review, commissioned at the 2013 General Assembly, of the Movement's global and regional response tools. This phase has included a combination of literature review, and interviews with (mostly) Movement representatives, including from the ICRC, the IFRC, and Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies from all regions in the world.

The present report pursues three lines of enquiry: a scoping of the current and future humanitarian environment, a retrospective review of the global tools to date, and determination of the required functionality of the global and regional tools to meet future needs. The resulting gap analysis, along with conclusions and recommendations, is designed to inform the second phase of the project, to be undertaken in 2016, when a deeper analysis of the individual tools will be carried out.

The current humanitarian response environment is being shaped by a convergence of conflict, climate change, food and water scarcity, demographic shifts, urbanisation and mass migration. Disasters and crises are affecting vast numbers of people, in particular the poorest and most vulnerable. Crises are prolonged and complex in nature, and there is no such thing as a purely natural disaster. Protracted situations such as in Somalia, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as a massive interconnected crisis in the Middle East region (Syrian, Iraq, Yemen, Libya), are having a global impact.

The humanitarian response system has grown in size and complexity along with the environment. Although the large majority of humanitarian funding still goes to the UN agencies, the international NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, there are growing numbers of small organisations and individual initiatives, powered by new technology and social media.

Other actors, such as the military and civil protection agencies are also playing a larger role, as are commercial enterprises. Many governments of disaster-affected countries are now far more capable of leading and coordinating responses, and are insisting on taking the lead.

An increase in actors and available resources has led to challenges for coordination mechanisms which can result in gaps or duplications, and political factors continue to hamper response in some of the big sudden onset natural disasters. Conversely, access to populations affected by complex emergencies has become more challenging, and many protracted crises receive almost no attention from the world's donors, aid agencies and media.

Most affected populations prefer and trust local responders over the international system, but only a small percentage of aid money goes directly to local and national actors. Humanitarian funding only covers two thirds of the assessed needs, and specialist sectors such as protection, security and economic recovery are particularly poorly covered.

Outside the Movement, there is a growing number of surge tools being developed by the UN, NGOs and national disaster management agencies (NDMA), among others. These include internal (professional) surge teams, rosters of experts (internal and external), partnerships with local service providers, and reliance on external organisations for skills such as needs assessments and information management.

The changing nature of both the operating environment (factors such as climate change, urbanisation, technological disasters, disease and fragile states) and the response itself (nationalisation and localisation, increased accountability requirements, competition for

funding, innovations) will have a huge impact on how the humanitarian system serves those in need over the coming decade.

The Movement's regional and global response tools are recognised as a unique capacity which is, in some ways, the envy of the sector. They bring huge resources to the aid of an affected NS, in personnel, technical expertise and material. However, the current configuration of tools is perceived to be falling significantly below its potential, and in need of profound adaptation.

Key weaknesses range from a lack of adequate strategic vision and operational procedures, to practical difficulties with culture, diversity and language. Key roles such as leadership, needs assessment, coordination, information management and accountability are not given adequate weight, while the service delivery tools suffer from being seen as inflexible or not cost effective.

Many of the difficulties are perceived to be linked to the financial architecture (not under review in this report) or lack of inter-operability between the national, regional and global levels. Political considerations, whether to do with sovereignty, domestic image or the respective roles and responsibilities of different parts of the Movement, are also seen to be important.

The future functionality of the response tools will need to be much more inclusive, allowing all NS to participate according to their resources and capacities. The tools will need to be more flexible, increasingly modular in nature, and predictable so that all NS know what is available, how quickly it can arrive and what it is capable of. The system will need to be centralised in some respects (standards, procedures at all levels, and training curricula) while decentralised in others (solutions as local as possible to the affected country). Roles and responsibilities at national, regional and global levels will need to be clarified, as well as enforced effectively to ensure good coordination.

Performance and accountability will be vital. People will need to be trained and deployed according to clear competencies, and the tools will need to demonstrate impact and value for money.

The recommendations which are made are meant as sign-posts to guide the next phase of the project, rather than specific indications for the individual tools. They come under five key headings:

1. Maintain the Movement's rightful place within the humanitarian sector
    - Work together as a Movement, manage the political factors, maintain compliance and standards, be responsive to the environment
2. Be able to act where others are not
    - Grow capacity and funding for silent emergencies, make resources available when funding is difficult, adapt to protracted crises
3. Capitalise on the unique qualities of the Movement
    - Act at all levels from local to global, use proximity to favour the most vulnerable, encourage peer-to-peer support and build NS capacity
4. Deploy the right people and capacities in the right place at the right time
    - Use both professional and volunteer capacity as appropriate, ensure all have equal opportunities in accordance with their competencies, modular and flexible tools, centres of excellence
5. Continually innovate and develop
    - Bold innovation in selected areas, review of financial architecture and information management tools, use digital technology

2. Introduction to the review

In early 2013, the International Federation Secretariat (IFRC) and a group of Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies (NS) made a proposal to hold a review of the Federation's Global Response Tools (GRT), with the aim of ensuring that the GRT would be fit to respond to the changing nature of disasters and the needs of disaster-affected communities over the next 5-10 years, as well as to changes within the Movement. The proposal of the review was endorsed by the Federation's General Assembly (GA) in November 2013.

The review has been divided into six distinct yet interlinked phases (phases 0-V)[2]. Phases 0-1 is planned for completion by end 2015 with the remaining phases envisaged for completion by the end of 2016.

A **Steering Group** comprising five NS (the American, British, Canadian, Netherlands and Norwegian Red Cross') is overseeing the review process and have the budgetary responsibility. In addition, the IFRC Disaster and Crisis Management (DCM) Department is part of the steering Group and, along with process managers from Swedish Red Cross and Canadian Red Cross, is providing further support in managing the review.

There is also a **Sponsor Group** of 15 NS for this piece of work[3], made up of NS who expressed support at the 2013 GA.

The present, first, phase of the review aims to take into consideration perspectives from the following:[4]

- The beneficiaries of emergency response interventions from affected communities (2nd stage only);
- NS that "own" and maintain, or contribute to, the current tools;
- NS that have received, or are likely to receive, global and regional response resources to assist them in their own disaster management (DM) activities;
- NS that are developing their own deployable response capacities and tools;
- The IFRC Secretariat (Geneva, regions, local offices);
- ICRC teams which use or deploy the Rapid Deployment Mechanism
- External humanitarian actors from the UN and NGOs.

The humanitarian environment in which the tools operate has changed over the last decade. Research points to potential trends that will affect humanitarian response including an increasing number of medium to small-scale disasters; an increase of neglected crises; an increase in urban-based disasters; and an increase in slow-onset and complex crises. The review aims to bring the Movement's global tools and the external environment together through reviewing the tools against a single, comprehensive picture of the future humanitarian environment and resulting needs.

[2] See Annex D for breakdown of review phases

[3] American Red Cross, British Red Cross, Canadian Red Cross, Colombian Red Cross, Danish Red Cross, Dominican Red Cross, Finnish Red Cross, Kenyan Red Cross, Lebanese Red Cross, Mexican Red Cross, Netherlands Red Cross, Norwegian Red Cross, Palestine Red Crescent, Swedish Red Cross, Syrian Arab Red Crescent

[4] The 2nd phase will go into more detailed analysis and consultation, including from actors external to the humanitarian sector and from a wider range of source materials

3. Background, purpose, scope & objectives

Background

The original proposal for a review of the global tools followed discussions at the global Disaster Management Working Group (DMWG) meeting in Washington DC in February 2013, where an action point was agreed to propose such a review. At the DMWG meeting in Hong Kong later that year, draft terms of reference (ToR) were discussed.

A consultant group was engaged in June 2014 to conduct the initial phase of the review. Their interim report was submitted in January 2015. Following a number of feedback sessions and production of a revised version of the report, the GTR working group rejected the report and the GTR was re-launched in the second half of 2015. A new consultant group, AAKO, comprised of four consultants, was engaged in September 2015 and are the authors of this report. This new team reviewed the report of the previous team and considered its findings and conclusions for its own work.

Purpose

A variety of different global tools have been in existence for well over a decade.[5] During that time most, if not all, have been the subject of a number of reviews. Many of the reviews have been undertaken post-deployment and reflect lessons identified during deployment. Some of the reviews have included a forward-looking component or have suggested adjustments to keep tools relevant to a changing humanitarian environment. The reviews have adopted different methodologies resulting in a lack of consistency and an inability to make comparisons – and therefore transfer of learning – challenging. Not all the reviews have included a focus on the inter-dependencies between the tools. In addition, the regional component and identity of some of the tools (such as the new Regional Response Unit (RRU) as an adaptation of the ERU) has seen a degree of adaptation that may challenge inter-operability with non-regional tools. Linked to this, the number of NS which are capable of and ambitious to lead on responses in their own countries and to contribute to the wider Movement response with tools and resources of their own has increased and is likely to increase in the future. This review is the most ambitious attempt to date to review the GRT system holistically, with a view to help the IFRC and NS to make them fit for purpose for the next decade.

Objectives

The review ToR set out three objectives which have been expanded upon with lines of enquiry in the following table. These lines of enquiry have been used to guide the questions used in the review tools, such as the interview/discussion guides.

Table 1: Objectives and lines of enquiry

Objectives	***Lines of enquiry***
1. A scoping of the humanitarian environment looking forward at least ten years (i.e. 2025) identifying changes to the environment, and resulting trends within which the global tools will operate and the needs they will	- Key surge and emergency response tools used outside the Movement (e.g. UN and NGO systems, key civil defence mechanisms) - Broader contextual humanitarian environment within which the GRTs will be operational over the next decade - Shifts in types and prevalence of armed violence, economic and

[5] The term "global tool" can refer to an NS or IFRC disaster response resource at all three tiers i.e. Tier 1 (national or local level); Tier 2 (regional or intra-Zonal); Tier 3 (global or inter-Zonal). The focus of the review is on Tiers 2 and 3.

seek to address. This will include natural and man-made disasters, population movements and complex emergencies in fragile states.	resource stresses, causes for population movement - Impact on changes in the environment on the unique nature and mandate of RC (e.g. auxiliary role)
2. A retrospective review of the global tools to date identifying not only their strengths and weaknesses both from the individual technical/sectoral perspective but also that of their inter-dependencies and inter-operabilities and the decision-making framework within which they are deployed (or not) to give a current "state of health" picture	- Contexts in which the GRTs have been utilised - Contexts in which the GRTs were not requested or deployed, with reasons - Strengths and weaknesses (holistic & strategic, not individual) of the GRTs - Interlinked nature of the different GRTs and associated strengths and weaknesses - Impact[6] of GRTs in selected recent deployments - Detailed map of required functionality of the GRTs for next decade - Challenges associated with GRT deployment and utilisation – past and future - Strategic gap analysis
3. Determination of the required functionality of the global tools to meet identified future needs	- Practical and political challenges relating to global tool deployment - Opportunities and challenges in terms of the future operating environment - Opportunities and challenges in light of potential changes in the Movement - Requirements that should/will be required of the tools over the next decade

This initial stage of the project includes some general conclusions about the impact of the global tools in their recent deployments, but detailed analysis of effectiveness, efficiency and value for money is envisaged for Phases II-V (in 2016), and will be dependent upon the availability of comparable financial and performance data.

Scope

The "Global Response Tools (GRT) system" is here used as a term to describe regionally and globally established surge capacity tools, as well as the decision-making system around them: the NS and IFRC key players and processes at national, regional and Geneva levels. Where possible, findings and conclusions are attributed to individual tools, but many comments are aimed at the system as a whole. The different tools will also be examined in more detail in the subsequent phases of the study.

In terms of **scope,** the primary GRTs that the review has focused on in phases 0-1 are as follows:

- Emergency Response Units (ERU)
- Field Assessment and Coordination Teams (FACT)
- Regional Disaster Response Teams (RDRT) or Regional Intervention Teams (RIT)
- Head of Emergency Operations (HEOps) and Developing (D-HEOps)

Some data, where significant, on other GRTs was also sought although this will receive more attention in phases II-V. Other GRTs include:

[6] The ability to measure impact will depend on the availability and quality of information such as evaluation reports and other analytical documents.

- Household Economic Security roster (HES)
- Federation Early Recovery Surge Team (FERST)
- Shelter Technical Team (STT)
- Shelter Coordination Teams (SCT)
- Regional Response Units (RRU)
- Cash (CTP) register
- ICRC's RDM (Rapid Deployment Mechanism)

As stated in the review ToR, the review will not consider the Disaster Management Information System (DMIS), Surge Information Management System (SIMS), Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF), Emergency Appeals (EA), National Disaster Response Teams (NDRT) or National Intervention Teams (NIT). Reference has however been made to these tools where applicable.

Various other pieces of work internal to the Movement which are going on in parallel to this will be referenced or linked as appropriate. These might include (not exhaustive) the review of the NDRT/RDRT in East Africa, the Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation (SMCC) project, the DREF Review, the Emergency Appeal Review (planned for 2016), the roll out of the ICRC's Safer Access Framework, the evaluation process for the new Regional Response Units in the Americas region, and others. In particular, the SMCC project is looking at how the components of the Movement can work better together to respond to disasters and crises, and will consider, at the highest levels, the Movement's future composition and mechanisms by looking at the ideas of combined appeals and streamlined infrastructure, logistics, etc. (known as the "Red pillar").

4. Review Methodology

A variety of methods were adopted for the review with a methodological approach outlined in the review Inception Report which was approved by the review Steering Committee.

The review team consists of four independent consultants with a solid understanding of humanitarian operating environments; the Movement; and surge response mechanisms. The team conducted the research primarily in English but a number of interviews were also undertaken in French and Spanish where appropriate.

The key tools used in phases 0-1 of the review are described in the following table.

Table 2: Review tools

Tools	Description	Stakeholder groups	Number planned	Number undertaken
Semi-structured interviews[7]	Semi-structured interviews conducted by telephone or in-person by the review team. The interviews were based on a series of questions from the interview guide. Each interview was for 40-60 minutes.	IFRC Secretariat in Geneva, regions and countries PNS staff "emerging" PNS staff NS staff ICRC	> 50	49

[7] A list of those consulted can be found at Annex A.

Group discussions	Discussion with small groups of NS staff / volunteers. The interviews were based on the same questionnaire as the individual interviews.	FACT, ERU and RDRT Team Leader trainees and delegates	--	2
Attendance at meetings	Where possible the review team was present at relevant meetings in order to undertake discussions and interviews to feed into the review process as well as to gain an understanding of the functionality of the tools. This included attendance at the Team Leader Training in Madrid at the end of October.	NS staff PNS staff IFRC Secretariat staff	2	1
Establishment a GTR portal/ on-line discussion group	An on-line portal or discussion group was established highlighting four key questions. www.globaltoolsreview.com	NS staff or representatives IFRC Secretariat staff		44 responses
Documentation review[8]	The desk review provided an objective entry point for the team, and served as a broad survey of existing data and information both directly and indirectly related to the humanitarian environment as well as the global tools to date. In Phases 0-I the review put particular focus on recent RTEs such as on Typhoon Haiyan, Ebola and Nepal earthquake, as well as RTEs and evaluations from other contexts and a literature review of the humanitarian environment with particular emphasis on the surge environment.			

Stakeholder interviews

Detailed interviews were undertaken against an agreed checklist of key issues and questions. Stakeholder discussions focused on the topics outlined in Table 1 above. The one-to-one stakeholder interviews allowed for an open line of questioning and interview guides were designed to remain flexible in order to respond to the different stakeholder groups. The guides were semi-structured allowing for probing in-depth into various issues and a deeper exploration into the complexity of the topics being covered.

The one-to-one discussions reached respondents from across the globe and from different operating environments as outlined in the table below:

Table 3: Interviews by region

Region	Planned interviews	Completed interviews
Africa	9	7
Asia Pacific	9	6
Americas	7	5
Europe	11	8
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)	6	4
IFRC Geneva & regions	9	8
IFRC HEOps	2	2
ICRC Geneva	1	1
FACT, ERU & RDRT Team Leaders	-- (not planned)	7 (2 groups, 7 in total)
UN OCHA - UNDAC	1	1
TOTAL	**54**	**49**

Out of a total of 56 interview requests, positive responses and interviews were held with 49 respondents (mostly individuals or pair of colleagues), representing all five regions, Geneva

[8] A list of key documents reviewed can be found at Annex B

HQs, GRT delegates, and both sending and receiving NS, as well as the ICRC and UN OCHA. In total, staff of 30 NS were interviewed for the review.

5. Overview of the current humanitarian response environment

The current humanitarian response environment is being shaped by a convergence of conflict, climate change, food and water scarcity, demographic shifts, urbanisation and mass migration. The number of man-made crises and natural disasters has steadily increased in the past fifty years with a recent decline in the last decade. Recently, it is more the complexity and length of crises that have marked the landscape.[9] In 2014, the United Nations (UN) declared four severe complex large-scale humanitarian crises ("Level 3 emergencies") - Iraq, South Sudan, Syria and the Central African Republic (CAR) - more than ever before since the creation of the UN. In the same vein, both UN and IFRC emergency appeals are tending to last longer – over 3 years is no longer rare.

Even though the number of deaths from disasters and conflicts has decreased in the past fifty years, the number of people affected continues to grow. For example, the number of people forcibly displaced worldwide is at its highest since War World II, at nearly 60 million people and the number in need of humanitarian assistance is at 80 million[10]. As crises become more protracted, and weather patterns less predictable across the globe, these numbers are only likely to further increase.[11] At the same time, the expectations on humanitarian assistance are growing as people have access to more and better information.

Chronic emergencies and lengthier natural disasters

In the past decade, slow onset and chronic emergencies have become the new norm. Further waves of violence and repeated natural disasters in countries already affected by conflict necessitate longer-term assistance[12]. Protracted crises are currently ongoing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan and the occupied Palestinian territories. This is in addition to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and the migration crisis in Europe (linked to ongoing crises in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Afghanistan among others) where long term consequences are still unclear.

In the past fifty years, the number of natural disasters has incrementally increased some five-fold; from 67 reported disasters in 1965 to 324 in 2014.A decline in the number reported from 2005 onwards is thought to be due to fewer governments declaring disasters as much as to the actual numbers decreasing[13]. Medium and small scale disasters make up the bulk of disasters. Disasters take a huge toll in terms of human suffering; in the past decade, nearly 100,000 people have died every year from disasters and over 100 million are affected annually. In 2014, the Ebola outbreak alone killed some 8,600 persons, more than the total number of all disasters that year.[14] However, even these numbers are far fewer than the

[9] inter alia the International Disaster Database http://www.emdat.be/

[10] OCHA (2015), *Global Humanitarian Overview*: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GHO-FINAL-web.pdf

[11] Red Cross Red Crescent Climate Centre forecast http://www.climatecentre.org/news/651/global-seasonal-forecast-nov-2015-jan-2016

[12] ALNAP (2015), *the State of the Humanitarian System.*

[13] (2015) *The International Disaster Database*: http://www.emdat.be/

[14] At some 8,200 deaths caused by disasters in 2014 (excluding Ebola), it was the lowest annual death toll since a decade as no mega-disaster occurred in 2014.

most catastrophic earthquakes; some 210,000 died as a result of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and up to 87,000 in the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan/Kashmir.



Figure 1 : Number of natural disasters by main sub-groups: 1965-2014[15]

Asia is the hardest hit and accounts for some 70-80% of all disaster victims annually. Disasters tend to affect low and middle income countries more, accounting for some 70% of all victims. Recently there have been some noticeable exceptions; 2005 Hurricane Katrina in the United States and the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami and earthquake in Japan.

Crises interconnected - natural and man-made

Although earthquakes and any resultant tsunamis, are often the deadliest type of disaster, hydro-meteorological disasters have seen the greatest increase in the past 50 years; storms, landslides, heat-waves, extreme cold, , hurricanes, typhoons and floods now account for some 70% of all disasters (see figure 1). Scientists believe that this increase is due to both natural and man-made factors. More intense storms and extreme weather are linked to the increasing temperature of the earth's ocean and atmosphere, which is caused by both global warming and natural temperature variations in tropical waters. Some of the most densely populated areas have seen rapid unplanned urban growth. These are also the most disaster-prone zones, where hazards overlap and increasingly occur, such as earthquakes, volcanoes, flooding and landslides[16].

Crises are increasingly connected and overlapping with consequences outside of their immediate location: the Ebola outbreak has led to a call for global emergency health mechanisms to be reformed; the Tōhoku tsunami and earthquake provoked a re-think of Europe's reliance on nuclear power; militant groups have created links stretching from Nigeria to Libya to Syria and Iraq.

The different characteristics of crises can also be interconnected and overlap. A sudden onset crisis such as an earthquake can create longer term development issues. A slow onset crisis, such as the European migration crisis could become a protracted crisis.

The following diagram shows a selection of current crises and their interconnectivity; each ellipse represents a distinct type of crisis illustrated by examples of current crises (non-exhaustive), and the ellipses overlap where there are known to be shared characteristics between the different types:

[15] Source: The International Disaster Database: http://www.emdat.be/

[16] Dilley, M. (2005). *Natural disaster hotspots: a global risk analysis* (Vol. 5). World Bank Publications.



Figure 2: Interconnectivity by type of crises with examples

6. Overview of current state of humanitarian surge

As the complexity and consequences of crises has grown, so too has the response. Today, a broad range of actors respond to crises: international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), UN agencies, national NGOs, government entities and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Military forces, religious institutions, initiatives of individuals or groups of private citizens, , private-sector entities and diaspora groups also increasingly play a role in addition to remittances and home-grown initiatives.

It is estimated that there are some 4,500 organisations that currently operate as humanitarian aid providers[17]. However, four out of five of these organisations are local NGOs. These NGOs receive a small fraction of external funding (between 0.3 – 1.6%) with the bulk of funds going to UN agencies (61%), INGOs (19%) and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (8%). The INGOs are dominated by five large INGOs that represent 31% of all funding; *Medecins sans Frontières* (MSF), Save the Children (SC), Oxfam, World Vision and the International Rescue Committee (IRC)[18].

The involvement of military, civil defence and civil protection assets in international humanitarian response is not new, but has grown enormously since the turn of the century. For example, ECHO has combined the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection functions of the EU, and NATO has developed doctrine to cover its role in disaster assistance (both of these came into force in 2001 and have been regularly updated since).[19] While the primary function of EU civil protection is to act within Europe, every major disaster around the world

[17] ALNAP. (2015), *the State of the Humanitarian System.*

[18] Ibid.

[19] http://www.nato.int/eadrcc/mcda-e.pdf & http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en

has seen the deployment of urban search and rescue (USAR) teams, security experts, medical teams, EU Aid volunteers and many others. The European Emergency Response Capacity (made up of emergency services personnel, military, police and other civil defence units) is a new addition first deployed during the Ebola crisis.[20] Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), among other inter-governmental organisations, have used disasters happening in their regions to drive the process of developing DM policy and capacity.[21] While these processes are very positive, the ever growing involvement of national and supra-national state bodies in humanitarian assistance has inevitably brought a whole range of competing priorities to the table (the EU, for example, cites as its top headline: "For every €1 invested in disaster prevention, €4 to €7 are saved in disaster response"[22]).

There are also more and more self-mobilised volunteers – individuals who want to take direct action to help those they see suffering in the media – especially when humanitarian needs are apparent in easily accessed locations (such as the recent migrant crisis in Europe). Crowd-sourcing funds, and organising over social media, make it possible to take this type of action quickly and cost-effectively.

Poor coordination and duplication

Given the range of actors, it is not surprising that recent crises were marked by uncoordinated approaches, as well as competition or duplication in emergency response: such as the Nepal earthquake (2015), Ebola outbreak (2014-15), Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013) and the Haiti earthquake (2010)[23]. Whereas recent UN reforms have improved collaboration between agencies and INGOs and their own internal coordination to some extent, the existing mechanisms are still challenged by the changing environment and new actors; they struggle to coordinate with increasingly strong national disaster management authorities (NDMAs) and new emerging actors, such as NGOs from Turkey, Brazil and the Gulf States and mobile government emergency response teams from countries such as China and India[24].

While many sudden onset crises have attracted an over-supply of responders, crises where there are protracted and/or security constraints there are a relatively small number of international actors present on the ground, such as South Sudan, CAR, Syria, DRC and Yemen.[25] MSF claims as a consequence, organisations prioritise assisting those who are easiest to access, rather than those who are in the most need[26].

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[20] Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism.

[21] http://m.peacefmonline.com/pages/news/social/201510/258755.php

[22] ECHO factsheet on Disaster Risk Management

[23] IASC. (October 2014), *Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response;* WHO (May 2015), *Report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel*; IASC (2010), *Haiti Earthquake Response, 6-Month Report*; ALNAP/ODI (2015), *Nepal Earthquake Response: Lessons for Operational Agencies*.

[24] Barnett, M. & Walker, P. (July 2015), *Regime Change for Humanitarian Aid*, Foreign Affairs 94.4.

[25] Healy, S, Tiller, S. (July 2014), *Where is everyone? Responding to emergencies in the most difficult places*, MSF; Austin, L. & O'Neil, G. (August 2015), *Baseline Report, Transforming Surge Project*, Start Network.

[26] Ibid.

Under-recognised and under-funded local actors

In these contexts and other crisis-affected countries, organisations have increasingly focused on working with national and grassroots partners, often local NGOs and including NS. Some NS indeed have become key partners to UN agencies or INGOs, although the nature of the collaboration varies from substantial partnership (implementation of Global Fund projects in Africa) to end-point implementation (food aid distribution for WFP in many countries). In most instances, the NS receives little or no capacity building or investment, and sometimes even basic operating costs are barely covered.

Although under-recognised and under-funded, both NS and other local actors play a key role in the final stages of delivery for the larger actors, and often work in a more collaborative and participative manner than international, regional or national actors[27]. While some of the large humanitarian organisations rely largely on a direct delivery model, such as MSF, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), SC and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), others, often faith-based organisations such as CAFOD, Christian Aid, Tearfund and Islamic Relief have adopted models that work mainly through local actors[28]. Feedback from communities indicate that local actors are best placed to understand and respond to their needs:



Figure 3: Communities' views -- Percentage who indicated local over international /national actors[29]

Growing capacity of national and regional actors

In disaster-affected countries, NDMAs, NGOs and NS have increasingly invested in disaster risk reduction (DRR), preparedness and response capacity and as a consequence lead many responses to small- and medium-scale disasters. This is the case in Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand[30]. As a result, some authorities do not require international support. In the 2015 Pakistan earthquake, the government stated

[27] IFRC. (2015), *World Disasters Report 2015*; Austin, L. & O'Neil, G. (2015), *Ibid*.

[28] Austin, L. & O'Neil, G. (August 2015), *Op. Cit.*

[29] Source: CHS Alliance. (2005), *Humanitarian Accountability Report.*

[30] Gingerich, T. R., & Cohen, M. J. (July 2015), *Turning the humanitarian system on its head.* Oxfam America.

that it would not issue an international appeal for help as it had the necessary resources to carry out the rescue and relief work[31].

Regional associations of governments have also become active in emergency response; such as ASEAN, that has established Emergency Rapid Assessment Teams (ERAT) for rapid deployment (within 24 hours) drawing from a pool of emergency personnel from ASEAN countries. Since 2008, the ERAT has deployed 54 members to 10 crises[32].

Demands for accountability and new approaches

As the number of organisations has grown, and the resulting competition between them, so too has the pressure on them to be more efficient, effective and accountable, notably to the affected persons they are assisting. As a result, the large humanitarian organisations have become more professional in their approach to emergency response, as reflected in their emergency response policies and tools, coupled with a growth in common standards and criteria, best illustrated by the development of the 2015 Core Humanitarian Standard on Accountability and Quality and the continued refinement and expansion of the SPHERE standards[33].

The range of response activities has also grown from traditional food, medical and relief assistance. Protection, gender, communication with affected populations and early recovery activities have moved from being considered as specialist activities to inclusion as mainstream programmes in many organisations. At the same time, new approaches have been adopted for the traditional activities; cash-based programming being a recent example.

Underfunded sectors but pre-positioned crisis funding

Based on financial information collected by the UN, an average of $19 billion (USD) has been given in humanitarian assistance each year since 2008, an increase of 400% compared with the 2005 ($4.6 billion)[34]. Despite this increase, this equated to only two thirds of the needs assessed. Large discrepancies can be seen in the stated needs and the funding provided by the type of sectors. Although protection has become more central to many crises, it remains underfunded by 70%, similar to safety and security of personnel, early recovery and agriculture. It is thought that this is not only due to donor priorities but also a lack of common operational definitions and approaches between organisations, protection being a case in point[35].

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[31] 'Pakistan not to seek foreign aid after deadly earthquake': http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/pakistan-not-to-seek-foreign-aid-after-deadly-earthquake-115102701589_1.html

[32] *About ERAT; The ASEAN-Emergency Response & Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT)*: http://www.ahacentre.org/about-erat

[33] Austin, L. & O'Neil, G. (2015), *Ibid*.

[34] OCHA. (2015), *Evaluation of Multi-Year Planning; Terms of Reference.*

[35] ALNAP. (2015), *Op Cit*.



Figure 4: Percentage of unmet funding needs by sector (2013)

Amongst INGOs, a relatively recent development has been the pre-positioning of funds for emergency response. Today, virtually all INGOs have allocated emergency funds, ranging from tens of thousands to half a million, that can be accessed immediately or within 48 hours, often also at the national level by their offices or established partners[36]. Although local NGOs receive very little direct funding, no reliable data exists on the resources they receive through implementing UN and INGO programmes. However, new financial initiatives are also emerging to respond better to emergencies and local needs. For example, the Country Based Pool Funds (CBPFs), managed by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) have proved to be a rapid and flexible source of funding at the country level, as has the UK's Start Fund, which allocates small funding grants within 72 hours to INGO partners[37]. As an indication, 10% of funds dispersed in 2014 by the CBPFs were to local and national NGOs, up from 1% in 2006[38].

Key surge and emergency response tools used outside the RCRC Movement

In the past decade, surge and emergency tools have been developed and refined by organisations, coupled with an increased focus on adopting organisation-wide emergency response policies and approaches, notably within UN agencies and the larger INGOs. In parallel, governments of affected countries have also developed further their own national disaster strategies, plans and tools[39]. The key surge and emergency responses tools currently in use are: [40]

[36] Austin, L. & O'Neil, G. (2015), *Op. Cit*.

[37] IFRC. (2015), *World Disasters Report 2015; Follow the money; are funding patterns keeping pace with trends and evidence* (chapter 4); *Start Fund Report 2015*: http://www.start-network.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Start-Fund-Annual-Report-2015.pdf

[38] IFRC. (2015), Ibid; ALNAP (2015), *the State of the Humanitarian System.*

[39] Austin, L. & O'Neil, G. (August 2015). *Op. Cit.;* IFRC. (2015), *Op. Cit*.; ALNAP. (2015), *Ibid*.

[40] Further details of these tools can be found at Annex C

- **HQ surge management teams** to manage and direct their organisational-wide approaches;
- **Stand-by teams** of permanent staff for deployment in crises, notably used by nearly all major INGOs;
- **Internal rosters** of existing staff pre-selected for deployment, used by UN agencies, INGOs, donor governments and the private sector;
- **External rosters** of persons that have experience in emergency response but are not current staff, used by mainly UN agencies and some INGOs;
- **Specialised rosters/registers** that offer very specialised profiles to UN agencies and INGOs and are either managed externally by third parties or through partnerships;
- **Partnership models** used by both INGOs and NDMAs that maintain networks of trained persons with national and local partners in disaster-affected countries;
- **External service providers** that offer services and products in support of emergency response to INGOs, UN agencies and NDMAs;
- **Response tools** drawn from existing UN and INGO food and medical programmes;
- **Coordination mechanisms** to coordinate emergency response within the UN, INGOs and/or national and local actors.

7. Analysis of the future humanitarian response environment

There is a general consensus that the world will continue to experience large complex crises but *"the occurrence of humanitarian emergencies can't be reliably predicted, and will always be 'spiky'"*[41]. Pressures on organisations responding to crises are likely to intensify in the coming years and will be shaped by environmental factors but also by the changing humanitarian response and its actors:

Environmental factors:

Urbanisation and urban violence will continue to pose considerable threats with an estimated 4 billion people expected to live in cities by 2030 with some 50% of these in high-risk informal settlements. In 2009, world population transitioned from a rural to an urban majority, bringing with it the benefits as well as the ills of urbanisation. In 2011 some 55,000 people died as a result of armed conflict. By contrast some 320,000 people died as a result of urban violence.[42]

Fragile economic conditions will continue to impact on the world with increasingly inter-dependent financial systems. Consequences are difficult to predict but political instability, migration, falling/rising living standards, greater inequality and changing of economic power-bases are likely.

Climate change and extreme weather is expected to lead to an increased number and intensity of storms, floods, typhoons and droughts, also leading to the possibility of population movements of climate change refugees and cascading into other disasters and factors such as urbanisation and economic conditions.

[41] ALNAP. (2015), *Op Cit*., p. 34.

[42] Muggah (2012), Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanisation, Poverty and Violence.

Populations in fragile or conflict-affected states will continue to be affected by multiple crises, both man-made and natural, contributing to long-term consequences such as massive population movements, disease outbreaks and developmental issues in general for these countries. Scarcity of resources such as water, food and energy will continue to fuel and provoke conflicts.

Technological disasters are becoming an increased risk, not because of an increased number of events (the trend is now stable, down from a high in 2005), but due to growing populations in urban areas who are vulnerable to secondary effects and overlaps with other disasters (e.g. earthquakes) as well as the impact of the event itself. [43]

Conflict-zones will be influenced by the proliferation of transnational armed and terrorist groups and the easy availability of weapons; civilians will continue to suffer massively when international humanitarian law is being violated, and access to all those affected will remain a challenge.

Disease will be spread by increasing mobility and urbanisation that provide opportunities for them to spread rapidly, whether these be new diseases, strains, those existing (tuberculosis, pneumonia) or those "dormant" (leprosy, polio, the bubonic plague). Antimicrobial resistance will add to known, emerging and unknown global health challenges.

Changing humanitarian response:

Actors responding to crises will continue to evolve; national governments of emerging economies (e.g. BRICSAMIT[44]and Gulf States amongst others) will be more and more present in crises (particularly sudden-onset), either through funding their own NGOs to be present or bilateral funding to disaster-affected governments, a way of funding they seem to prefer (rather than passing through INGOs or UN agencies)[45].

National governments of affected-countries will be more present leading humanitarian response rather than the current top-down system of the UN and INGOs. This is being promoted by the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) and will require those international actors who currently dominate the emergency response system to share the space with national governments and local actors, and adapt their coordination systems accordingly (which currently overwhelmingly favour and facilitate international actors). Regional organisations, NDMAs and related government services will continue to be reinforced and be capable of responding to small- and medium-scale disasters and will not always seek international support to respond. Governments of affected states will look internally for support or within their region, but less from the international level.

Non-state Armed Actors of varying degrees of political maturity and legitimacy, and their role in obstructing or facilitating humanitarian action is already a standing presence in many natural disasters and armed conflict situations.

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[43] IFRC World Disaster Reports 2012, 2014

[44] BRICSAMIT: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey.

[45] Some 44% of humanitarian funds of governments of emerging economies (non-OECD) go directly to affected governments, compared to 3% of funds of western governments. Source: IFRC (2015), *World Disasters Report 2015; Follow the money; are funding patterns keeping pace with trends and evidence* (chapter 4).

The role of local actors will continue to grow in importance; even if they are not yet provided with the necessary resources and support, their role will increase both in countries where insecurity implies that they are the only active actor on the ground and in middle-income economies where they will be relied upon as partners for strengthened NDMAs. Equally, remittances from diaspora communities will continue to play an important role in developing coping mechanisms and responses to crises, as will the spread of telecommunication systems providing quick and inexpensive communications. Cheap and accessible mobile phone services and other technology will also facilitate beneficiary registration, distribution of assistance and monitoring, for example. There is also a growing recognition that local actors can (and do) fill some of the gaps seen between response, recovery and development[46].

More accountability will be required of humanitarian organisations; whether it be to the affected populations they are serving, the governments of affected countries, their donors, peers or supporters. The 2016 WHS is strongly profiling accountability to affected populations and certain initiatives such as the World Health Organisation's Global Emergency Medical Teams Registry and the Humanitarian Quality Assurance Initiative (essentially facilitating third party verification and certification for NGOs) could lead to further standardisation of services and "pre-qualification" for organisations to operate in crises for some aspects. Simultaneously, INGOs will be under continued pressure by governments of some affected countries to ensure that they are not acting against national interests (the "foreign agent" phenomenon that started in Russia, also now seen in Sudan and elsewhere).

Funding will become more competitive, nuanced and possibly flexible; humanitarian organisations will increasingly recognise that solid and predictable funding is needed to support emergency response and dedicate the funds needed for a rapid reaction, and as more actors increase competitiveness. However, the overall funding pool will become more nuanced as new funders enter the market (e.g. foundations, private sector, emerging economies, self-fundraising, peer-to-peer giving) and this will alter the nature of humanitarian assistance. For example, BRICSAMIT countries will push for a more equal approach between "donor" and "receiver" countries and favour direct support to governments. Individual donors will increasingly want to have more feedback on how their donations are used as will corporate supporters who will also seek to provide support in kind or from their own personnel as volunteers (which might then be converted into financial support). More flexible funding pools from traditional donors could emerge, such as the Start Fund and the CBPFs that would provide more access to funding for national and local actors. But limitations could still remain given the move for more stringent vetting of organisations for fear of funds going to terrorist organisations, money laundering or corruption[47].

Linking resilience, poverty and inequality will take more prominence as chronic emergencies will push the humanitarian system to reach beyond its traditional mandate and begin responding to the underlying causes of these crises, such as poverty and limited state capacity. Humanitarian organisations will find themselves increasingly filling this gap as

[46] IFRC. (2015), *Op. Cit.*

[47] Gingerich, T. R., & Cohen, M. J. (July 2015), *Op. Cit.*

development actors today are favouring state-building over community-based projects that develop local resilience and capacity[48].

Humanitarian agencies will increasingly seek innovative and new approaches for crisis response; given the challenging environment, the growth of new approaches will continue such as cash/voucher programming, digital mapping and crowd sourcing for needs analysis or more efficient water treatment methods. Funding is increasingly available for humanitarian innovation and organisation such as OCHA, Mercy Corps, Internews, UNHCR, UNICEF, MSF, ICRC and OCHA have established new units, initiatives and innovation labs to develop and foster new approaches and ideas[49].

8. Overall state of health of the RC/RC Global Response Tools [50]

The following section provides an overview of the current "state of health" of the four key global response tools taken into consideration during this phase of the review[51], along with some comments about the other tools. The strategic strengths and weaknesses of the tools are highlighted as well as the linkages between them. The impact of deployment of the tools, and how this is measured, is also discussed. This analysis recognises that significant investments have been made by NS in these tools. The analysis shows that a clear gap has been identified between the required functionality and the current system, although details of the various aspects of this are yet to be identified, with the individual tools not yet examined.

Taken as a whole, the feedback tends towards preference for a substantial re-thinking of the Movement's surge system in response to crises and disasters, while ensuring that the key elements – e.g. speed, technical excellence, predictability – are maintained. It will be required during the next phase of the study to establish precisely the extent of the gap, and where are the needs for reform – in the system as a whole and its performance, as well as the various aspects of the system.

Strengths

From all parts of the Movement, there was endorsement for a system of global, regional and national surge capacities, as a unique way in which the Movement works together to help each other and those affected by disasters and crises. It was stressed many times that any review must focus on what is worth keeping, as well as the aspects which need revision. The points below are general rather than specific in nature, and make no attempt to analyse the individual tools.

What the GRTs can bring to a response

Resources. For a large scale disaster response, the Movement can bring to bear an unrivalled suite of human, material and financial resources, and a coherent and principled

[48] Ibid.

[49] Betts, A. & Bloom, L. (November 2014), *Humanitarian Innovation: The State of the Art*. OCHA Policy and Studies Series, 009. The Humanitarian Innovation Fund has provided some GBP 1,800,000 to over 50 innovation projects to date: http://www.elrha.org/hif/home/

[50] All content of this section is based on the interviews, web portal responses and meetings within the frame of this review as sources – it does not reflect the opinion of AAKO or the SG

[51] FACT, ERU, RDRT, HEOps/D-HEOps

approach, which are the envy of even the largest INGO family and second only in scale and scope to the UN. The huge investments which have been made in the tools over the years have resulted in high standards of training, kit and operating procedures, none of which should be discarded, but rather will need to be modified with improvements.

Predictability and availability. The tools are highly appreciated for being well established, well known and predictably available. They bring strong additional capacity to support a NS requesting assistance in the early stages of a response. In many cases, the tools can be mobilised very quickly, and can make available to the NS an experience of a wide range of other contexts to assist them to put together the most effective response in the quickest possible time. Resources can be brought from a neighbouring country or from across the world, and complement each other in a layered and inter-operable way.

Technical capacity. Strong operational leaders (HEOps and Team Leaders for FACT, RDRT and ERU), effective coordinators, and technical capacity from a single expert to an entire hospital staff, can be made available at short notice. Relief goods and services can be brought in or set up by virtue of pre-positioned stocks and well-trained teams.

What they can leave behind after deployment

"Emergency" capacity building. Many NS much appreciate that, in the best case, GRT teams can build capacity in their counterparts (primarily NS staff and volunteers) as they work, leave behind skills and expertise, and raise awareness of what is possible when the Movement works together. NS who deploy their staff and volunteers talked of them bringing valuable experience back to their own NS for future disaster responses.

Equipment and resources. NS which experience recurrent disasters have been able to re-use or adapt equipment or other resources which have been left behind from an ERU deployment, thus enhancing their own capacity to respond in the future.

What they can facilitate while in country

A principled response. Bringing together Red Cross and Red Crescent staff and volunteers from across the globe enhances the Movement's principles of Humanity, Unity and Universality through a show of powerful solidarity between sister NSs, as well as the ICRC and IFRC.

Operational leadership. Operational leadership was mentioned many times as vital to a good response, and the HEOps (or D-HEOps when this has deployed in the HEOps function) is almost universally seen as having added value in coordination, planning, and authoritative decision-making.

Information management. One of the most prevalent themes in the feedback was the importance of managing information in all its forms, and this was cited, to an extent, as another strength of the GRT system. DMIS and SIMS were both mentioned as strong tools to assist with sharing information at all levels, from the affected branches to the Geneva HQs.

Support to fundraising. Deploying the GRTs can help to boost the funding support for an emergency appeal (EA), either by bringing funding from the government of a country which sends an ERU (there is a strong correlation here), by raising the media profile of the situation, or by enhancing confidence in the quality of the response.

Weaknesses

While there is a lot to celebrate and preserve, the GRT system as a whole is perceived by the majority of the interview respondents as outdated, overly bureaucratic, sometimes uncoordinated and operating at a level which is less than the sum of its parts. There are big challenges with the specific tools as well as their performance, which need to be addressed urgently to ensure that the Movement remains a relevant and significant player in the fast-evolving and complex world of disaster and crisis response. The following points are those which found a large degree of consensus among the interviewees.

Lack of vision. There is a lack of strategy and vision at strategic level in terms of the Movement's role, functionality and priorities in the humanitarian response sector as a whole, and in particular with regard to how to use the GRTs.

Leadership role in disaster response. Operational leadership within the GRT system is critically important (success of an operation is perceived as having close association with the leadership quality); however, the role often performs under par (the role rather than individuals), with the roles of team leaders and coordinators being under-resourced or under-estimated.

Standard Operating Procedures. There are no revised Global Response Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) as yet, which is perceived as one of the most acute problems of the response system; regional SOPs are inconsistent both vertically and horizontally, so don't work well in pulling the system together. This can result in long delays in deploying the appropriate tools, especially if there are several layers of bureaucracy (in the Federation) or multiple reporting lines to work through.

Decentralisation. The decentralisation of the IFRC secretariat, while seen as a good thing in many ways, has complicated the processes of response; frequent changes to the regional structures also do not help. There is lack of clarity about who has final authority – NS, region or Geneva – over what or who is deployed.

Organic development of the system. The GRT system in its entirety has not been comprehensively overhauled since its inception 20 years ago – as a result, change has happened organically; unplanned and uncoordinated developments or an inability to change when it is required has left the system outdated, overly bureaucratic, unresponsive to new challenges and with compromised effectiveness and efficiency. New initiatives can be valuable and welcome, but might be limited in their scope and ambition: for example, the Regional Response Units (RRU) in the Americas region (also being looked at in the Asia Pacific region) has had some success, and there are lessons to be learned from it. However, it has been developed in an uncoordinated way, without finding a proper place in the overall system as yet, and not sustainable from the funding point of view.

North-south dynamics. The global tools (in particular FACT and ERUs) are perceived to be dominated by a few Participating NS (PNS) (ERUs are relatively expensive to maintain and only a few can invest in them), and are perceived as being "European" or "western" in character, which is not always welcome, and may be perceived as being imposed by either the PNS or the IFRC in Geneva. There is a perception that such resources could be available more locally, or at least at regional level. On the other hand, the RDRT/RIT rosters, which vary widely in quality depending on the region, are often hard to maintain or deploy effectively (and difficult to find funding for), which leads to these resources being underused and badly maintained. While it will never be feasible or cost effective for all NS to retain large standby capacities, the global emergency response system should be developed and financed according to the capacities of all NS, and based on a proper risk analysis for each context.

Link between media profile and funding. The deployment of the tools is dependent on funding availability or other factors affecting the ability of the "owner" PNS to deploy, which is in turn linked to the media profile of the event or crisis, rather than the humanitarian needs. At the same time, many emerging NS with strong capacities are available, but their use is not facilitated – or coordinated if it does deploy. The link between the tools and the funds which support them has other implications; the most important of these being that the scale of humanitarian needs is no longer the principal driver for deployment of the largest or best resources – the threat to an impartial, independent response based on need hits at the Movement's very core.

Push versus Pull factors. The sending PNS ("owners") are recently perceived to be inclined, in contravention of the ERU SOPs, to take decisions on deployment based on their own interests or political pressures, which can lead to the "push" factors outweighing the "pull" from the NS requesting assistance, or an assessment based on needs. It was even stated that, from the point of view of the sending NS, there is a perception that the decision-making system discourages working in accordance with deployment rules and norms, as NS may be obliged to prioritise the competing pressures from donors, public, partners, media and others.

Coordination. Coordination is not always well done (this goes beyond the GRTs), even though it is widely agreed to be one of the most critical functions of any response. This has particular implications as the number of NS able and keen to respond with their own resources either in an uncoordinated way (NS aware and agrees but little interaction with the rest of the Movement's response), or even unilaterally (NS not sufficiently involved), increases and there are neither effective sanctions against uncoordinated working, nor sufficient inducement to encourage "good" practice.[52]

Support to NS when tools deployed. The NS requesting assistance can feel side-lined or disempowered when the "circus comes to town", and there is insufficient allowance made for ensuring the NS has a lead role which is supported rather than undermined. In the worst case, an affected NS will not call upon regional or global support mechanisms, for fear of being overwhelmed by the incoming assistance, thus taking up essential capacity needed to respond to the disaster itself. The GRTs often take an approach of one-way "provider" (e.g. an ERU will provide the health or other service, rather than working in an integrated way with the NS requesting assistance), rather than two-way facilitator (e.g. using counterparts, attempting to hand over some roles within the ERU to NS or perhaps RDRT personnel), which while it has obvious strengths in an emergency, leaves the Movement behind the thinking of much of the rest of the humanitarian sector.

Professional versus volunteer delegates. A delegate may be deployed because s/he is funded rather than for suitable skills or experience, so they may be the wrong person for the role or not of the right quality; this can lead to them being set up to fail in the role. Many of the FACT, ERU and other rosters are populated by those who are not professional aid workers, or who deploy rarely. There is no significant standing or stand-by capacity for emergency response, either at the Federation or among NS, as seen in virtually all INGOs today. NS are also not being held accountable for non-compliance with the operational procedures, such as sending unqualified persons as part of GRTs.

Rosters are unreliable. While it is recognised that there are large numbers of skilled and qualified people in the system, motivation can be an issue if conditions of service are unfair, or professional opportunities not available; high rates of turnover of staff and rosters increase

[52] Some respondents mentioned improvements during the Nepal EQ 2015 response, but many still felt that emerging PNS are not well coordinated.

inefficiencies (e.g. in training) and can affect reliability and standards. There is also insufficient emphasis on gender and diversity issues within the HR pool.

Length of deployments for surge capacity. The short rotations and deployments often leave a wide "transition gap" while either the NS, the IFRC or other partner NS struggle to find and bring in resources for the post-disaster phase. On the other hand, many NS rely on volunteers for deployments who are only available for short periods: it will be a peculiar challenge to retain the volunteer nature of the Movement's response at the same time as improving sustainability and professionalism.

Awareness. While a great deal is invested in the tools, it cannot be guaranteed that they will succeed when it comes to deployment. This is linked to poor preparation and dissemination: many NS are not fully aware of all the tools, what support may be available, or how the system works. Pre-disaster arrangements, even for predictable or recurrent events, while highly valued in some cases, can be haphazard or insufficient. Other less well known tools, such as the Shelter Coordination or HES teams, may be left in a vacuum unconnected to other teams or the NS.

Flexibility. The tools are seen by many NS (perhaps wrongly, as many of the tools can be modularised) as inflexible, "off the shelf" solutions which do not fit the smaller or atypical situations. The larger, expensive resources (such as some of the health and Watsan ERUs) are not often used except for big responses, and currently have a limited role for preparedness, smaller disasters or in "peacetime". GRTs are not always able to adapt to changes in the environment, such as working in urban environments and the need for military-civilian relations.

Variable quality of training. Training can be of varied quality according to where it is done, how the syllabus has been created, or the resources which can be allocated. The curricula are not all currently standardised even for the different ERUs, let alone for RDRTs or other regional tools (core curriculum may exist but they are not necessarily applied by all). Training and preparation does not easily allow for interoperability between the rosters, or for NS to work together in multinational teams. Deployments can also depend on who happens to be available on a given day.

Performance management. There are insufficient systems for individuals' performance to be managed effectively; there is no competency framework or key performance indicators for people or teams to work from (some areas are currently working on this, health was an example given). Bilateral contributions are not held to account, or their effectiveness measured by any consistent standard. Proliferation of tools and teams without an overall performance framework can risk standards falling.

Real Time Evaluations. Many of the recommendations from real time or other evaluations are not, or do not appear to be, put into effect, so learning can be frustratingly slow or even non-existent. An example is repeated recommendations in real time evaluations (RTEs) about the need to clarify roles and responsibilities of the different structures and individual roles involved in a response. Of course, there are examples of good learning, such as the HEOps and D-HEOps programme as a response to repeated recommendations to improve operational leadership.

Accountability. The GRTs are not always seen as being fully accountable to the people in need they are deployed to serve, or perceived to be fully in compliance with the Fundamental Principles (such as independence from government, or impartiality) or the Principles and Rules of Humanitarian Assistance. In the worst case they can even be a burden to the NS requesting assistance rather than add value. Compliance with the P&Rs, or with the various

SOPs in existence, is not well enforced, and there are few risks associated with non-compliance.

Multiple roles of FACT. The coordination tools, especially FACT, may struggle to perform simultaneously and to a satisfactory standard all of their required functions (leadership, coordination, assessment, implementation), due to lack of capacity, time or simply too many competing priorities.

Assessments. The precise role of the GRTs in carrying out assessments (as opposed to the NS) is unclear – it is one of the roles of the FACT, or perhaps RDRT, teams, but can lose out to other priorities. Good quality needs assessment is vital for producing quality Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) and Emergency Appeal (EA) documents.

Technological innovation. It has not been possible to keep up with technological or methodological advances in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Despite being the biggest humanitarian network in the world, the Movement's response tools and methods are lagging behind in the use of cash, technology, communicating with people in need, user-generated solutions and information management, among others.

Linkages

Layered interdependence. One of the greatest strengths of the Movement is its potential to be present at every level from local to global. Having a multi-layered, interdependent system built into the GRTs is essential from the point of view of delivery, sustainability, efficiency and acceptance. Without strong capacity in each NS (now called NDRT), there can be no regional resources (RDRT/RIT). The regional capacities can also be linked to the global tools, to allow for career progression, meritocratic assignments and cost-effective responses. Without compromising on quality, standards or accountability, all NS can play a useful role in supporting each other during times of crisis. Tools which are now too expensive to deploy to smaller disasters might be replicated at a more local, and modest, level (looked at another way, this would simply be the RDRT function having greater material, technical and logistical resources available to them when needed).

Inter-operability. Some good examples of this came out of the Nepal earthquake response, such as RDRTs complementing ERU teams (e.g. the MSM team in Chautera was joined by RDRTs specialising in water supply, community health and hygiene promotion). "Bolt on" additions to ERUs, such as the Community Health Module, have had mixed success in practice but are recognised as being a step forward in principle [53].

It is not systematically clear whether – for example – regional experts (RDRT/RIT) are best used as a complement to the coordination tools (e.g. FACT) or the service delivery of the ERUs – this should depend on the profile of each individual and on the identified gaps, but in reality it is haphazard at best. It will also be important to deal with practical issues such as language (GRTs are seen as largely Anglophone, with many training materials not available in all languages), terms and conditions, personal kit and travel restrictions.

Many of the interviewed respondents described an "ideal" system of surge tools which could be closely adapted to the situation and context. It is apparent that other humanitarian organisations, notably the large INGO families, face similar challenges, and are trying a variety of solutions[54]. These innovations can be used to inform the next phases of this review.

[53] Various end of mission reports e.g. from Mozambique and Philippines

[54] See section 6 and Annex C.

Coordination & Leadership. No other tool received more affirmation from the feedback in interviews than the HEOps role; perhaps this was because it is relatively new, but perhaps it is because the function fills an absolutely critical role. It has been said many times in many ways that operational leadership is the aspect of disaster response which is most important, and most challenging to get right – and this applies to the Movement as much as any other organisation. While there is no question that many NS have excellent leadership, there is a unique set of skills which make up an effective operational leader in large scale emergencies.

Almost as important as leadership is effective coordination – another overused and misunderstood term. The recent SMCC project – has seen both Geneva institutions and many NS agree that a lot of work needs to be done to improve the way the components of the Movement work together, especially in disaster and crisis management. The GRTs – in their widest sense – have a key role to play in this process. [55]

Information management is equally critical, whether it is producing maps to aid assessments or identify gaps, compiling reports to account to donors, or simply ensuring that all parts of a large response "machine" know everything that is going on. It is not possible to separate activities from the management of the information surrounding them, and both must be improved together.

Service Provision. No other single humanitarian organisation has a wider skill set when it comes to delivering goods and services to people in need than the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. There are GRTs to provide relief aid (such as food, essential items, shelter, clean water, cash) and essential services (such as sanitation, protection, logistics, healthcare, communication).

Key considerations include ensuring that people in need are treated with dignity and respect, that the response keeps in mind the different needs of men and boys, women and girls, those with special needs or disabilities, and the elderly. All these crosscutting issues and themes must be built into the functioning of the GRTs, to enable a NS not only to assist people, but to build back better for the future. For example, detailed assessments showing disaggregated data on key vulnerable groups would assist all stages of the programme cycle.

Financial Framework. Although the DREF and EA systems are not part of this review[56], it is impossible to ignore the linkages that exist. The challenges related to staging an adequate response to a large-scale but slow onset or silent emergency are largely related to the difficulties in raising sufficient funding from an EA (i.e. a reactive fundraising mechanism). The recent DREF review has highlighted some key recommendations about how to make it more accountable and effective, including several points aimed at increasing the effectiveness of RDRT deployments (e.g. management training and better kit).

In addition, many of the interviewed respondents for this review have highlighted the need for a larger emergency fund (i.e. a pre-positioning mechanism), which would among other things help to ensure that the appropriate GRTs could be deployed when needed and immediate funding available to the NS requesting assistance. While it is recognised that the DREF and RDRT/RIT personnel are the first surge assistance available to an NS – and are very

[55] SMCC Plan of Action 2016-2017

[56] A review of the Emergency Appeal process is planned in 2016

welcome as such – the majority view is that this does not go far enough to support the needs of the many smaller, low profile or neglected crises.

More substantially, it may eventually, after the second phase of this study, be required to reconsider the financing arrangements for deploying the GRTs, and any surge capacity,, as this is one of the main reasons for the present "exclusive" nature of (in particular) the ERUs, and the inevitable "power dynamics" that go with this.

Impact

Despite many attempts, it remains the case that "there is no accepted definition of 'impact' within the humanitarian sector…"."[57] The OECD-DAC definition for development states that "impact looks at the wider effects of the project – social, economic, technical, environmental – on individuals, gender- and age-groups, communities and institutions. Impacts can be intended and unintended, positive and negative, macro (sector) and micro (household)".[58]

It was almost unanimously agreed that the impact of the Movement's disaster response tools (within the wider context of the whole response) is extremely hard to define and measure. Many PNS only attempt to measure the inputs or outputs of their deployments; as the tools are only part of a larger response it is genuinely difficult to extract the role of the GRTs from the whole in any meaningful way. There are, of course, exceptions to this, including such indicators as the patients treated by one of the health teams, and the subsequent affect on the health of a population, which can be measured with some accuracy. Otherwise, impact measurement tends to be less tangible, such as the positive impact evaluation of the HEOps / D-HEOps initiative[59].

Another way to measure "impact" of the higher profile tools such as FACT or ERU is in the positive effects on levels of fundraising for the response (i.e. the links between media exposure and donor enthusiasm put another way).

Many NS did see a positive impact on their own performance, and reputation, as a result of the deployment of GRTs, although this was not a unanimous view. Work needs to be done to ensure that the GRTs leave more behind for the NS than equipment and funds – they must also build capacity and facilitate the subsequent phases of the response (recovery, or preparedness for next time) if at all possible.

9. Implications of the future humanitarian surge world and how the GRTs should adapt

As noted in Section 7 above, recent years have seen a convergence of conflict, natural hazard induced disasters, food and water scarcity, population movement and urbanization. The number of disasters has progressively risen in complexity and duration.

Looking to the future, and indications that the trends identified in recent years are likely to continue in the same way, this section aims to identify the implications for the current GRTs and how they (or adapted tools) can best operate in this environment.

[57] Hofmann C. A. et. al., ODI (2004) *Measuring the Impact of Humanitarian Aid*

[58] http://betterevaluation.org/evaluation-options/dac_criteria

[59] IFRC: HEOps mid term review 2013

Internal coordination – Increasingly, NS have developed local and national level emergency response guidelines, reporting templates, contingency plans and SOPs. Overlooking of NS guidance by GRT staff has led to frustration, tension and potential conflict. There is a need for increased awareness of the systems and structures that NS have in place prior to deployment of the GRTs in order that they are able to operate positively and efficiently into contexts with which GRT staff are often unfamiliar.

External coordination – There are a number of new and emerging surge actors including governments; NGOs from countries not previously heavily involved in response; the military; and private sector organisations. There remains the need for the Movement to ensure coordination with "new" humanitarian actors in order to ensure effective responses. In addition, improvements are required to the way that the GRTs assist with cluster coordination. There is a lot to be learnt from the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) system, and the growing number of surge systems being employed by the various large INGO families.

External surge systems – Countries affected by disaster frequently have surge and response systems in place which have been agreed by governments (at national and/or regional levels). NS are often part of these systems. An example is the Incident Command System (ICS) that is used in the Philippines and by other ASEAN states. The ICS provides a framework and model for disaster response and management to facilitate joint disaster emergency response. The Philippines Red Cross is expected to work within this framework but has been challenged by the fact that the Movement GRTs do not coordinate with it.

Surge environment – The global surge environment is likely to continue to change in the coming years. In addition to the emergence of new actors and more localised responses, international humanitarian organisations are continually developing surge tools in terms of personnel and equipment. The surge environment is increasingly competitive. NS are often asked not only to be part of a Movement response but also to work with and alongside other surge actors.

New technology - The increased use of technology in humanitarian response needs to be taken into consideration in the design and development of the GRTs. For example, using technology in order to deliver rapid cash-based assistance to those affected by disaster[60]; and the use of humanitarian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs[61]) for assessment and mapping purposes.

Visibility and financing – The ability to fund the deployment of GRTs is often connected to the level of media profile that a disaster receives. For larger disasters funds are readily available but for those which do not receive significant (if any) media coverage, problems have been faced with regard to financing deployments. With the number of disasters predicted to increase, the ability of the Movement to finance GRT deployments, particularly for small scale or forgotten disasters will remain an issue.

Slow onset and protracted crises – The last decade has seen a number of significant slow onset disasters (such as the 2011 Horn of Africa drought) and protracted and regional crises (such as the Syrian regional crisis). The global tools are not currently well adapted for such operating environments having been designed primarily for large scale rapid onset emergencies (and predominantly in a rural setting). Protracted crises often imply a mixture of natural disasters, failing infrastructure and armed conflict, in this respect the NS and GRTs

[60] A potential link with relief ERUs and with the cash register.

[61] A potential link with FACT and other tools undertaking assessments – useful for mapping purposes.

have to be able to better complement ICRC response tools and programmes, as well as working through the IFRC coordination. The SMCC project is designed to bring the ICRC and IFRC closer together to work with and in support of NS in protracted, complex emergencies.

Contextual and geographical variation – As noted above, the GRTs are not well-designed to respond in a number of situations where the IFRC and NS are expected to be operational. Many countries and regions rarely experience large scale sudden onset crises but are more prone to minor shocks in development contexts. This can be seen throughout Africa. The tools are insufficiently flexible to respond effectively in such situations.

Localised responses – There is increasing recognition that national and local responses to disaster need to be better supported. NS will continue to play a role in responding to disasters in their own countries, particularly as auxiliaries to their national governments and due to their nationwide presence. Investment in and strengthening of NDRTs and RDRTs (as part of preparedness work) could be an effective way for the Movement to ensure rapid local responses to disasters without having to deploy costly global tools.

Sectoral responses – Whilst the existing GRTs have been able to support "traditional" sectoral responses (such as water/sanitation, shelter, relief, health), the range of immediate mainstreamed response activities has grown to include issues such as protection and communication with affected populations as well as cross-cutting themes such as gender and diversity. The current IFRC GRTs are not well-placed to cover such activities.[62] Of note, increasingly natural disasters include protection-related issues and it is no longer only limited to armed conflicts.

Accountability – With an increasing emphasis on the need for accountability, there are limited effective approaches to measuring and reporting on the impact of the current GRTs.

10. Future required functionality of the GRTs and gap analysis

Based on discussions held during the review and a review of evaluations of GRT deployments, this section highlights some of the likely future requirements for the GRTs from a holistic (as opposed to individual tool) perspective emphasising areas where there are current gaps. The issues have been listed in an approximate order of the degree of consensus between interviewees. While all of these gap areas found strong support among those interviewed, it was not possible due to the qualitative nature of the questionnaire to apply more stringent verification.

No.	Gap area	Current state/situation	Future state/requirements
1	**Inclusivity**	An increasing number of NS are capable of not only leading responses in their own countries but have the desire and capability to contribute to wider Movement responses with tools and resources of their own. However, the current system makes this extremely difficult as contributing to the GRTs is perceived as a "closed club" open only to those NS that have sufficient financial resources to be involved (while all NS might have	Methods for ensuring increased involvement of all NS that have capacity but are not currently part of the global tools system needs further attention. In particular, a way to overcome the obstacle of the financial implications will need to be explored in some detail. NS which have resources, but do not choose to be part of the GRT system will need to be addressed to find a way to make the system acceptable, or more generally to match the available resources with the needs.

[62] The ICRC's RDM does include two different protection competencies.

No.	Gap area	Current state/situation	Future state/requirements
		the technical skills). NS may have skills to offer but not the financing nor the ability to, for example, establish an entire ERU. NS that are currently not part of the GRT system but have significant skills and resources to offer are finding it hard to be included in the system (with the exception of putting forward people for RDRT/RIT rosters) thereby reducing the potential availability of additional resources to support Movement surge responses.	It may also be necessary to do a comprehensive review of the financing arrangements for the GRTs – which are inextricably linked to the DREF and EA mechanisms. This will require further analysis. There is a paradox between the desire to be more inclusive and how to share the cost of developing, training, maintaining and deploying the tools. This will require more analysis.
2	**Timeliness**	One of the identified weaknesses of the GRTs is the time it can take for them to be deployed. With the ambition of deploying within 48 hours this does not always happen due to issues such as lack of availability of staff with the desired profile, lack of funding and negotiations to deploy staff within the response mechanism. It also depends upon the given tool.	Based on an analysis of past experience, realistic timeframes within which NS can expect individual and groups of GRTs to arrive in-country needs to be assessed and clarified.
3	**SOP development**	Whilst there are a number of existing SOPs for individual GRTs, the Global SOPs remain unadopted and in draft form.	There is a clear need to finalise the Global SOPs for disaster response, and to ensure the various regional SOPs are linked in. The SOPs for the FACT, ERU and RDRT/RIT, as well as the overall concept of operations for slow onset disasters as well as sudden onset, will also need to be adapted in due course.
4	**Awareness**	A number of NS are not aware of the GRTs that they can access and what to expect from individual tools or a range of tools if deployed.	There is a need for increased awareness of which tools are available and what they are capable of (including how they work together and what flexible options might be appropriate for different situations).
5	**Flexibility and modularity**	The current GRTs allow for a selection of an entire tool (or tools) such as an ERU or a FACT. The possibility exists to request different elements of the tools but it is not widely known.	Increased flexibility in allowing NS to select which elements of the GRTs are most appropriate for a given context may ensure that more effective and cost-efficient responses which are clearly linked to needs are implemented. This flexibility should include the option to send just people and not hardware or to send, or example, selected items from an ERU with one person as opposed to a team of four. Whilst this may be more complex to manage for a deploying NS but it will link better with the needs of NS. Another trend which is now beginning and which will need to be expanded is for multinational teams – some NS contribute personnel to other PNS's ERU deployments.
6	**Preparedness**	A number of NS have their own NDRTs and NITs and contribute staff to global tools such as RDRTs and FACT. With increasing emphasis being put on localised	NS will continue to play an important role responding to disasters in their own countries, and regional support mechanisms between NS will grow. There needs to be greater investment in NDRT capacity to ensure that

No.	Gap area	Current state/situation	Future state/requirements
		responses it is important that all NS are in a position to be part of effective responses, particularly when global tools are deployed	NS are fully prepared to play an active and central role in future disaster response, and also because this is the basis for regional and global capacity.
7	**Language**	With the GRT documentation (and training material) currently only being available in English this limits the ability of a number of NS to be more involved.	Bearing in mind the increase in local responses, the tools need to be adapted to more languages (at a minimum in French, Spanish and Arabic, and possibly Russian), so that there can be optimised involvement of NS more globally.
8	**Competencies**	It is not always possible to deploy staff with the right competencies and this primarily in relation to either soft skills (which are important in order that relationships can be established between the GRT staff and the NS or other GRT staff) and non-technical skills such as being able to rapidly draft plans of action or contributions to emergency appeals. These skills (analysis, planning, writing, assessment) are frequently areas in which NS request assistance at the onset of a response.	Analysis of key competencies that are (a) required and (b) existing within the GRT framework needs to be undertaken in order to identify skills and competency gaps across the tools to ensure that these gaps can be addressed for future deployments. Issues of compliance and accountability for respecting such frameworks needs also to be considered.
9	**Roles and responsibilities**	There is lack of clarity regarding linkages between NS requesting assistance and deployed GRTs. This lack of clarity is heightened when multiple tools are deployed simultaneously, putting pressure on NS to understand which GRT staff to coordinate with. At times NS have felt bypassed by team leaders leading to negative perceptions of the tools and their utility.	Improved clarity on roles and how GRT teams should behave in relation to NS and other national bodies is required.
10	**HEOps**	When deployed, there has been positive feedback in relation to HEOps. However, there are limited numbers of HEOps available – this is potentially linked to competencies. This role is considered to be beneficial in terms of supporting and advising NS during an emergency response and developing linkages with other GRTs – linkages which are often challenging for an NS to develop when they are frequently having to implement a direct response thereby limiting their capacity to connect with deployed GRTs.	There will be a need for more (and more predictable) deployments of the HEOps, D-HEOps or similar capacity. Urgent focus needs to be committed to identifying more individuals to undertake the highly-valued HEOps role, or senior operations management standby capacity. As it is not financially viable to have many HEOps on standby, NS should be asked to make more middle and senior managers available for occasional surge missions. Another possible model is the initiative of the British RC in having full-time "Global Surge Delegates" which includes individuals with strong leadership profiles.
11	**Decentralisation and localisation**	The current primarily centralised management of the GRTs is not in line with the increased movement of the rest of the humanitarian system to facilitating and supporting localised and regional responses. The RDRT and other more locally-	With an increased emphasis on the need for more local responses, the GRTs need to adapt and move away from a uniquely centralised approach. While retaining the advantages of centralised SOPs, training standards, decision-making and good coordination, the GRTs must become effective on regional levels (including

No.	Gap area	Current state/situation	Future state/requirements
		centred tools such as the NITs, NDRTs, and RITs provide positive examples of a de-centralised approach to the GRTs and these tools are much appreciated and valued both by NS requesting assistance and PNS.	sub-regional peer to peer support mechanisms). If the GRTs become more inclusive and local, deployments will be fewer and will need to be smarter.
12	**Coordination**	The current disconnect between the tools is considered to hinder more effective responses.	In their current format there is a need to strengthen linkages between the different GRTs e.g. between ERUs and RDRTs or ERUs and FACT. Linkages between the different tools or teams need to be made clear to the PNS, the NS requesting assistance, and tool staff members.
13	**Innovation**	The GRTs need to take on board the growth of new approaches in humanitarian response. Some steps have already been made in this direction (the recent development of a cash programming register and inclusion of cash in the relief ERU for example). However, there needs to be a greater emphasis and understanding of innovative developments in response for which there is likely to be increased donor funding in the future.	The focus needs to be on employing and equipping staff with relevant skills as well as creating and adapting tools to ensure that they are in line with latest technology.
14	**Assimilation with existing internal and external systems**	At national level (and also at regional level in some cases), there are existing humanitarian response systems and processes in place. These are sometimes government-led/managed and sometimes specific to NS. Experience shows that the GRTs do not always take these existing systems and processes into account during deployment leading to tension, duplication and gap creation in responses.	The GRTs will need to be better informed of humanitarian response systems and processes that are already in existence at national level in order to avoid uncoordinated, duplicative or conflicting approaches to assessment and response. This includes the need for awareness and understanding of government-led mechanisms as well as systems that have been put in place by the NS.
15	**Information Management**	The SIMS is currently only linked to FACT deployments and not to any of the other GRTs and this leaves a gap when FACT teams leave.	In order to ensure continuity and continued support in the critical area of information management (IM), availability of SIMS – and the development and use of other IM tools and methods, needs to be re-thought.
16	**Accountability**	There are currently limited mechanisms in place to measure and report on the effectiveness and impact of the global tools (whether as individual tools or the GRT system as a whole (i.e. the IFRC zone, the NS, etc.). With an increasing emphasis on the need for accountability, this is a gap that needs to be addressed.	In an increasingly competitive surge environment, it is likely that the IFRC will be required to provide more evidence of the impact and effectiveness of the GRTs. Systems to allow for this monitoring, measurement and reporting will need to be developed. The absence of an internal accountability system has to be recognised, i.e. the ToR requests 5 persons and the PNS sends 10. It may also be required or advantageous to participate in one or more of the "pre-qualification" and registration processes – for example for Foreign Medical

No.	Gap area	Current state/situation	Future state/requirements
			Teams (FMT) – which are currently under development or consideration.
17	**External coordination**	A large number of new and emerging actors are involved in surge responses. To date, the Movement has not articulated how the GRTs will best work with and alongside these new actors. This includes working to assist in cluster coordination.	Far more emphasis will need to be placed on the "soft" skills aspects of response capacity – including coordination both internal to the Movement and external. It must be a core function of all responses.
18	**Goods clearance & pre-disaster agreements**	An integral part of a number of existing ERUs is that they deploy with commodities e.g. relief, medical and water/sanitation items. At times there have been customs-related difficulties in ensuring the rapid entry into receiving countries of ERU commodities resulting in deployment delays.	There is a need for a pre-understanding, on a country by country basis, of the legal requirements for bringing such items into countries affected by disaster. There are clear linkages here with the IFRC's work on International Disaster Response Law (IDRL).
19	**New technology**	Recent years has seen the development of new technology in terms of mapping and undertaking assessments; and registering and assisting beneficiaries. Whilst the GRTs have taken on board some new approaches (for example, systems to be used by those on the cash-programming register), there remains room for further development in this area.	The GRTs need to be further developed or re-designed in order to take on board relevant innovation in the area of new technology if it is to remain competitive within the growing surge environment.
20	**Contextual adaptability**	The current GRTs have been designed primarily for use in large scale sudden onset disasters. How to most effectively deploy GRTs into slow onset and protracted crises remains unclear.	With the increase in protracted and regional crises that has been seen in recent years, the GRTs need to adapt in order that they are able to function effectively in a broad range of contexts and not just large scale sudden onset disasters.
21	**Sectoral responses**	The existing GRTs have been able to play a key role in "traditional" sectoral responses. A number of other sectors are becoming increasingly mainstreamed including protection, gender and diversity, and communicating with disaster affected populations. The current GRTs are not well placed to include such activities.	There will be a need for the GRTs to ensure that they are able to provide a contribution in all sectors within which the Movement has an interest or role. This will require adaptation to existing GRT approaches or development of new tools.
22	**Comprehensive Approach**	Also known as 3D approach, or as OCHA calls it: 'interoperability'. RCRC like all humanitarian actors will be faced with a loosening of the interpretation of humanitarian principles by many others. Combined with government agencies wanting more presence on the ground (ECHO volunteers, military or civil protection actors, etc.).	The Movement will need to defend the humanitarian principles, and ensure that the GRTs work in such a way to support this, while also being flexible enough to take account of the changing ways in which others work.

No.	Gap area	Current state/situation	Future state/requirements
23	**Security**	International humanitarian actors are less present in very challenging security environments.[63] NS are always present, but there may be less support when needed if PNS cannot justify – or are unable to – send personnel into high risk locations.	The GRTs already work with the ICRC in armed conflict situations, and this will need to be improved/increased in future, and synergies with their Safer Access and Health Care in Danger initiatives. The Movement needs to retain proximity to affected populations.

11. Conclusions & recommendations

The following section will provide sign-posts for the next phase of the study. For example, it will be important to consider the question of breadth versus depth and whether the tools should aim to complement higher technical capacities and gaps for the humanitarian sector as a whole, or be structured to be more relevant to supporting the NS role and building NS capacities.

Another issue will be to look at how to optimise strategic management (centralised standards, procedures, training curricula, etc.) as opposed to operational management (decentralised capacities, etc.) and how to ensure that decisions are made at the appropriate level.

Although the GRTs are seen as a single system, it will also be important to look at the various individual tools, and types of resource, which comprise the system. It is not only the GRTs which need to be considered, but also the decision-making environment of the NS and the IFRC in which they exist. It is apparent that "politics" play an important role in how the Movement works – the exact nature and importance of these political influences will need more enquiry to determine how to the maximise the benefits and minimise the avoidable challenges associated with them.

Conclusions

External environment. Any review of the GRTs must take into account both the external and internal environments in which they operate. In the humanitarian operating world at large, it is apparent that needs are increasing, and also becoming more protracted and complex. At the same time, funding sources are becoming more diverse but equally demanding as some one third of needs remain unfunded. The humanitarian sector has grown in terms of the number and nature of actors involved, leading to more competition and complexity. Donors and affected populations alike are more demanding of humanitarian organisations to be more comprehensive, coherent, accountable, and new technology and methodology is emerging rapidly.

Internal environment. Internal to the Movement, change is happening just as quickly. The IFRC structure has decentralised and is still to some extent in a state of flux, notably in some of the most vulnerable regions of the world such as Africa. Proliferation of layers and structures has led to a lack of clarity in authority and responsibility, and has made transparent and consistent decision making even in times of urgency far more challenging.

Many NS which might have previously depended on external help during times of crisis are developing their own capacities to respond, and are asserting their sovereignty, thanks in

[63] MSF 2014: *Op Cit.*

part to capacity building by the IFRC and others. There is a blurring of the old distinctions between the "donor" and "recipient" NS, for example with some in Europe now calling upon others for assistance with the migrant crisis and African NS assisting each other.

As has already been mentioned, this review is happening at the same time as several other strands of work, and must take these into account to build on the work of the various NS and IFRC regions, the SMCC project and others.

A key element that is always present in how the Movement does its business in disaster response is the complex political pressures which exist on NS and the IFRC alike, to ensure their own survival and development, to fulfil the needs of those affected by the disaster but also of their own public, donors and the governments to which they act as auxiliary. These politics cannot be ignored or dismissed as "unprincipled"; all the factors must be considered when looking at how to make the GRT system work the best.

People. The most common feedback during the interviews and research for this project was that the most critical component of any response is the people: "it depends on the individual doing the job". It is apparent that there is a huge wealth of competent human resources available to the NS and the IFRC, whether staff members, volunteers or the delegates who are brought in from the outside for temporary assignments. It is equally apparent that in some cases these individuals are not adequately trained or equipped to perform their functions, or a person without the required skills and competencies is put into a role, thus setting them up to fail. Performance is not always well managed either, so the best people lose motivation or look for opportunities outside, while the weaker elements continue to struggle or not improve.

Response capacity. The tools themselves do some really excellent work, saving many lives and protecting the livelihoods and dignity of people affected by disasters and crises. However, they are no longer ideally adapted to the humanitarian operating environment and require some fairly radical rethinking in terms of how they operate both individually and as an entire system, including how they are managed.

"Soft" functions. Even though many NS are capable and wish to take a leading role in response within their own country, large-scale or protracted crises almost always put overwhelming pressure on the leadership, management and coordination functions of a NS. If a response is not well managed and coordinated, it invariably does not perform well overall. However, these "soft skills" are not well provided for in the GRT system, which is weighted towards the technical and sectoral. In a world increasingly dominated by the digital, and where information is demanded in real time, the GRTs are not able to manage information sufficiently well to facilitate effective response planning, or the accountability demands of the many stakeholders involved.

Technical tools. Providing goods and services to disaster affected people is the core objective of the GRT system, and in many ways it does this well when the local infrastructure or markets are overwhelmed or destroyed. However, bringing in teams and resources from across the world rather than those which exist nearby, or giving out imported supplies which may be available to buy in the local market, may not be the best solution, and certainly is not cost effective. Ways to adapt the GRTs to different situations, such as slow onset disasters, urban contexts, small scale needs or the use of new technology, will need to be examined in more detail.

Support functions. Some of the key functions which support the GRTs – Human Resources, Finance, Assessment, Reporting, Monitoring & Evaluation – are either not covered at all or are seriously under resourced within the GRT system. Even Logistics – one

of the most basic and critical functions of any effective response – is not always given the priority it needs.

Performance and Accountability. Value for money (VfM) demands are already a reality for traditional donors, and increasingly so for others, although the definition of what constitutes VfM of course varies. The UK government has a wide definition: *"[the need to] seek value for money, not crudely through comparing costs but through focussing on achieving the best outcomes for affected people and improving the quality of future decision-making..."*[64], others have different considerations in mind, such as domestic visibility or simply cutting costs. Whichever perspective is applied, VfM considerations will need to be looked into in more detail. The implications of the Common Humanitarian Standard (CHS) initiative, the registration of FMTs, and others related to pre-qualification, certification or regulation of humanitarian assets will also be highly relevant to the evolution of the Movement's GRTs and their effectiveness, efficiency and performance.

Recommendations

The following set of recommendations is designed to be thought-provoking and to provide sign-posts for the next phase of this project – the detailed gap analysis and proposed plan of action. They do not, therefore, propose any detailed or minor changes to improve the current system, but rather look at the future needs and the potential that the Movement, and in particular the NS and IFRC, has to become more effective at responding to disasters and crises.

As the term "Global Response Tools" has been seen as confusing (it refers to regional tools as well, but this is not always understood) and even divisive (an exclusive club of PNS as opposed to all NS) by many respondents to this review, it is proposed to find a new term in future, such as the Movement's "Response Surge Tools".

Maintain the Movement's rightful place in the humanitarian sector

1) **Work as a single Movement.** The SMCC outputs are encouraging; the Movement has huge potential to increase synergy and impact by working together. The GRTs themselves are one small part of this huge jigsaw, but can be developed to act as a catalyst for closer coordination and working practices across the Movement, including with the ICRC.

2) **Take coordination seriously.** Coordination capacity needs to be one of the first deployments along with operational leadership and assessment, not an afterthought. Whether to coordinate internally between the various types of Movement players, or to represent the NS and the Movement at external meetings, there is a huge amount of work to be done, and it cannot be done as part of an operational leaders' ToR, or by the NS alone. The ICRC, for example, has Movement and external coordination as a core competency within their RDM, but there is no direct equivalent so far in the other GRTs beyond being part of a team leader's role (this could be considered as a FACT profile in itself, for example).

3) **Manage the political factors creatively and constructively.** It is inevitable that some NS will want to respond bilaterally at the urging of their domestic audience or government, and that others will be happier to receive help from some partners rather than others (to name just a few elements!). At all levels, whether when neighbours help each other, or the whole Movement brings its weight to bear, it is necessary to

[64] DFID CHASE: External reference for partners - Value for Money in Humanitarian Programming

start making these political influences part of the solution rather than fighting against them. A GRT system which is reconfigured to take account of the geographical, sectoral and political strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats, as well as the realities of bilateral partnerships and regional vested interests, will be more effective.

4) **Compliance is essential.** While accepting that the politics are real, it is equally essential to insist (if and when these are not compatible) on compliance with the fundamental principles, the Principles and Rules of Humanitarian Assistance, and existing and future SOPs. The global SOPs for disaster response must be agreed, and then enforced by all.

5) **Be more aware of the external environment.** The Movement can learn from how others are adapting to the greater needs for surge capacity and how to manage it; at the same time, coordination in the field with the clusters, and with military, private and government actors is essential, so it needs to be deliberately built into the structure and functioning of the GRTs.

Be able to act where others are not

6) **Use high profile events to grow fundraising and capacity for preparedness and silent emergencies**. When funds are plentiful, response capacity can be built into NS which suffer recurrent disasters, and high profile disasters can be used for advocacy about neglected crises which do not attract media attention. The high profile of the big GRTs, and the unique work they do, are ideal ways to raise awareness among domestic audiences. Consideration of how to allocate resources more according to demand than supply might lead to looking at the EA and EPoA systems as part of this review, or as a subsequent priority.

7) **Expand resources available for the "unfundables".** When the GRTs are not required for high profile disasters, part of the capacity should be made available, at the expense of the NSs who own, lead or contribute to them, to protracted or slow onset emergencies (even pre-positioned when an event can be predicted ahead of time, e.g. cyclone season, or for when a small disaster receives no media attention and therefore little dedicated funding support). Standby capacity and response experts should maintain their skill levels by getting experience this way. When other organisations leave, or are not present, the NS will always be there; the GRTs need to adapt to find ways to support them and provide impartial assistance to the affected populations.

8) **Adapt tools to allow for longer-term presence if needed**. The "transition gap" between surge and longer term appointments is a constant challenge, but it is not possible or desirable to have large ERUs or the FACT team present for many months. There needs to be at least some capacity which is designed to fill the transition gap, or to be present when no other is available to take over.

Capitalise on the uniqueness of the Movement

9) **Use all the levels from local to global.** Every NS may be able to provide capacity and people into the GRT system. National level response capacity develops into regional level, which then merges into global tools in a layered approach, each building on the other rather than being separate or in competition or duplication with each other.

10) **Use proximity in favour of the most vulnerable – protection, gender and diversity, disability, communication with affected people.** People affected by disaster trust assistance from their own community more than anything else, but not every NS can fulfill all their needs with their existing capacity. At the same time, the NS has greater proximity to affected or vulnerable people than almost any other

humanitarian organisation. As expectations from communities rise, and there are increasing numbers of actors involved in the mainstream response, the GRTs need to be layered from national to regional and global levels. A key niche for the GRTs should be also in ensuring that all especially vulnerable people, including those in minority groups, are well served by the response.

11) **Encourage peer-to-peer support, both before and during crisis**. Many NS are already involved in this, and there is a lot to learn in order to roll it out as an approach across all regions where appropriate. Pre-disaster agreements between neighbouring NS (eg in Central and South America and South East Asia) have proved very helpful in facilitating rapid and predictable response in time of need. Although not always the case, it is perceived that help from close by will have greater local knowledge (language, culture, etc.) and will require less induction and support.

12) **Capacity building of NS alongside use of the GRTs.** It will be increasingly valid and essential to ensure that all NS are able to respond to disasters and crises in their own countries. While this cannot be a core function of the GRTs, a more strategic approach to gap analysis leading to long term development of NS capacities should be considered. NS in disaster-prone countries must benefit from a complementary long term strategy of investment in capacity. No matter how strong the GRTs, the Movement will struggle to deliver response operations at scale as long as NS are not able to provide core services and functions.

Deploy the right people and capacities in the right place at the right time

13) **Standby teams, internal rosters, external registers**. There is a clear case for more standby capacity – in a similar vein to the HEOps or D-HEOps, but in multiple roles – either within the IFRC or in some NS. Very important will be to merge the global and regional HR databases, thus removing the distinction between them (as is seen for example between FACT or ERU, and the RDRT/RIT presently). Both professional and volunteer HR is required – for example, it makes sense to have professional aid workers in leadership and management roles, while well-trained volunteers are often best suited for the service delivery functions. While some situations require entire teams to deploy, others would benefit from a single delegate, whether technical specialist or operations manager.

14) **Layered competencies framework.** One of the best ways to ensure consistent standards would be to have training based on agreed competencies at the various levels. Most other organisations which have specialist surge capacity (including the ICRC) base their roles on a competency framework; this would need to be layered for different levels (e.g. a Water and sanitation engineer from any NS could be qualified to work nationally, regionally or globally).

15) **Ensure the best people from all NS get opportunities.** Experience is the only way for staff and volunteers to improve their competence in response, so even the smaller disasters would merit a small team, or a few individuals, deploying. Even when key individuals lead a response within their own NS, it should be perceived as "surge" experience. It is a well-known political challenge within the Movement and elsewhere to ensure that opportunities are made available on merit: the GRTs can lead the way in this.

16) **Multinational teams.** Those NS who have the expertise or resources to maintain their own ERUs need to put increased effort into bringing in people from either the NS requesting assistance, other NS from the region, or simply individuals from any NS who have the required skills. It would be a challenge to the accepted norm that ERU teams need always to train together, but would be a driver for more standardised

training curricula, or for NS to invite others to join their training courses. This would also help the GRTs to be more appropriate in terms of language and culture.

17) **Modular tools and capacities.** The GRTs are more flexible now than is at first apparent, but much more can be done to ensure there is no such thing as an "all or nothing" approach. NS would know what they can ask for, and the providing NSs would be able to put together much more adapted packages.

18) **Sector "champions" to lead on training and kit**. Well-resourced PNS can take a lead agency role in a given sector or type of service provision tool (e.g. for Field Hospital, Water, Logistics, Relief), working with others to find and train the right people, as well as making part of the resource available for the smaller or low profile emergencies.

Continually innovate and develop

19) **Select a few areas for innovation – e.g. CTP and IM.** The RCM system cannot do everything, and there are some innovations at which it may not be possible for a large and bureaucratic network to excel. It will be important to choose those which can be rolled out, and have advantages, at scale and taking advantages of the NS's proximity and national role. One possible example could be to further develop technologies in communicating with, and providing information to, affected populations. CTP is another possibility, although some NGOs are well ahead of the Movement so far.

20) **Review of FedNet, DMIS and support to SIMS**. Even the basics (email systems, maladaptation to quality of internet connection) cause many problems. A review of all the Movement's IM tools used in response is overdue (according to many participants in this study so far).

21) **Facilitate new initiatives such as crowdfunding, social media response and person-to-person links**. The way the IFRC raises funds for emergencies (the EA) has not changed for many years. It may be possible to use the GRTs as a mechanism by which to reinforce the continuing support of loyal donors as well as reach out to new sources of funding, information and interest.

Annex A: List of National Societies and individuals interviewed

ICRC

David Horobin	Head of Security & Crisis Management, Geneva

IFRC

Alberto Monguzzi	Head of DMU, Europe region
Dorothy Francis	former Senior Surge Officer, DCM, Geneva
Emma Sturrock	RDRT specialist, AP region
Inigo Barrena	Head of DMU, Americas region
JP Taschereau	former Head of Emergency Operations
Leif Jonsson	DM Coordinator, Asia Pacific region
Lucia Lasso	Head of DMU, Africa region
Paco Maldonado	Senior Surge Officer, DCM, Geneva
Pieter de Rijke	former Senior Surge Officer, DCM, Geneva
Steve McAndrew	Head of Emergency Operations
Sune Bulow	Senior Surge Officer, DCM, Geneva

7 participants from the FACT, ERU & RDRT Team Leader training, Madrid

National Societies [65]

American Red Cross
Australian Red Cross
British Red Cross
Canadian Red Cross
Colombian Red Cross
DR Congo Red Cross
German Red Cross
Indonesian Red Cross (PMI)
Jamaican Red Cross
Japanese Red Cross
Jordanian Red Crescent
Kyrgyz Red Crescent
Lebanese Red Cross
Madagascar Red Cross
Magen David Adom
Nepal Red Cross
Netherlands Red Cross
Nigerian Red Cross
Norwegian Red Cross
Palestine Red Crescent
Peruvian Red Cross
Philippines Red Cross
Qatar Red Crescent
Red Cross Society of China/Hong Kong autonomous branch
Serbian Red Cross
Sierra Leone Red Cross
South Sudan Red Cross
Swedish Red Cross
Tanzania Red Cross
Zimbabwe Red Cross

[65] NS were represented by the Secretary General, the Head of International, Head of DM, or similar in most cases; it was agreed that names would be left out and no attribution given to particular remarks

Annex B: List of key references

Key Documents

IFRC World Disaster Report 2015 – Local Actors
ALNAP State of the Humanitarian System 2015
CHS Alliance - Humanitarian Accountability Report 2015
START Network Transforming Surge Capacity – Lois Austin & Glenn O'Neil
MSF - Where is Everybody? – Sean Healy & Sandrine Tiller
Oxfam - Turning the Humanitarian System on its Head
Regime Change for Humanitarian Aid – Michael Barnett & Peter Walker
Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence – Robert Muggah
DFID CHASE: External reference for partners - Value for Money in Humanitarian Programming

IFRC DREF Evaluation Report 2015
IFRC Briefing Note: Building Disaster Risk Management capacity 2015
IFRC Real Time Evaluation, Nepal EQ 2015 (draft)
IFRC Real Time Evaluation, Typhoon Haiyan 2013
IFRC Real Time Evaluation, Ebola crisis 2015 (summary)
IFRC Real Time Evaluation, Syria crisis 2014
SMCC Plan of Action 2016-17
SMCC Resolution for General Assembly 2015 (draft)
Global Surge Working Group report, Nairobi 2015
Global Surge Working Group RTE meta-analysis

Selected Web Links

IFRC: http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/world-disasters-report/world-disasters-report/
International Disaster Database: http://www.emdat.be/
ALNAP: http://www.alnap.org/ , http://www.alnap.org/what-we-do/effectiveness/sohs
CHS: http://chsalliance.org/
INFORM (risk mapping): http://www.inform-index.org/
ODI: http://www.odi.org/publications/7344-disaster-risk-management-post-2015-development-goals-potential-targets-indicators , http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/281.pdf

Annex C: Key surge and emergency response tools used outside the RCRC Movement – full descriptions

HQ surge management: UN agencies, INGOs and donor governments (such as the US and UK) all have HQ-based staff responsible for managing surge and emergency response across their organisations. These staff are generally not deployed in crises but more so manage the tools and approaches that are used. National governments have also strengthened their NDMAs.

Stand-by teams: In recent years, stand-by teams of permanent staff for deployment in crises have been increasingly and successfully adopted in recent years, notably by nearly all of the major INGOs. Save the Children UK has one of the largest teams of 75 staff that are deployed permanently from crisis to crisis. Although expensive to maintain, large agencies have reported that this approach works well given their ability to immediately deploy highly qualified staff. Challenges have been seen with teams in terms of staff management (training, appraisals, leave entitlements, turnover) and managing their time when not deployed[66].

Internal rosters: Organisations, including UN agencies, INGOs, donor governments and the private sector use rosters as one of their main tool for sourcing staff for surge deployments. The majority of rosters are internal, i.e. they call on existing staff that have been pre-selected for deployment, either individually or as part of an emergency response team. These rosters increasingly use not only HQ-based staff but also staff from field/regional locations. INGOs such as Islamic Relief and CARE have also developed regional rosters in Asia, but the use of regional rosters was found to be linked to existing organisational structures, i.e. if a regional structure was in place, they were more likely to have a regional roster[67]. Examples include OCHA's Emergency Response Roster that draws on staff worldwide; ActionAid's Emergency Fast Action Support Team of some 70 staff; DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian Security Operations Team (CHASE OT) of some 80 staff; and the emergency telecommunication teams (staff drawn from rosters) of the British Telecom, Ericsson and Vodafone. Challenges in managing roster include having staff released from their current roles for temporary deployment, (even if a pre-agreement exists), having the capacity to keep rosters current and retaining a diverse roster in terms of culture, language and technical skills.

External rosters: To a lesser extent, organisations have also established rosters of persons that have experience in emergency response but are not current staff. For example, this is the approach used by ASEAN for their ERAT teams and by OCHA for their specialised teams for sudden onset crises, the (UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination – UNDAC), which mobilises staff from 14 partnership organisations, mostly NDMAs and INGOs. In additional, some organisations have combined internal and external rosters, such as CARE and Plan International, although the balance of internal to external is some 70-30. Similar issues have been seen with these external rosters as for internal rosters, as described above.

Specialised rosters/registers: The last decade has seen a growth in rosters/registers offering specialised staff to agencies, that differ from internal and external rosters as they offer very specialised profiles and are managed externally by third parties or through partnerships. Examples include the following rosters/registers that offer the following specialised staff: communications and media (from the CDAC Network), needs assessment

[66] Austin, L. & O'Neil, G. (2015), *Op. Cit*.

[67] Ibid.

(from the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS)), protection (ProCap) and gender (GenCap) (managed jointly by OCHA and NRC), logistics (Danish Refugee Council (DRC)) and camp coordination and camp management (CCCMCap from NRC). These rosters/registers mainly provide staff to UN agencies (logistics DRC, ProCap and GenCap) or UN agencies and INGOs (ACAPS, CCCMCap, CDAC).

Partnership models: As alternatives or complements to stand-by teams or rosters, some INGOs have established and maintained networks with national and local partners in disaster-affected countries, training their staff and volunteers and equipping them with some basic materials. For example, CAFOD in the Philippines has established Emergency Preparedness and Response Teams in some 15 locations (linked to local catholic church dioceses), prioritizing those that are in hazard prone areas. A similar approach has also been taken by NDMAs in some countries.

External service providers: More so than offering staff for humanitarian organisations, new service providers have emerged that offer services and products in support of surge and emergency response. For example, in the fields of emergency mapping (MapAction, CartONG), needs assessment (ACAPS), IDP profiling (Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS)), training (Humanitarian Leadership Academy) and cash-based services of the private sector (MasterCard and Red Rose).

Response tools drawn from existing programmes: Humanitarian organisations have created response tools that draw on existing food and medical assistance programmes, that are already operational in a given country. One example is UNICEF's "Rapid Response Mechanism" (RRM) which is set up in collaboration with other UN agencies (WFP, OCHA) and INGOs (e.g. DRC, Solidarités, IRC, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), NRC, ACTED, ACF). The RRM has been operational in several contexts including Iraq, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic and mobilises teams of existing staff to respond to critical gaps in humanitarian coverage[68].

Coordination mechanisms: the UN has established coordination mechanisms that aim to coordinate its own emergency response and that of other actors (mostly INGOs). This includes the cluster system (if existing in a disaster-affected country), the Humanitarian Country Team and the On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) for sudden-onset crises. In addition, the OSOCC is supported by an online platform and a broader range of actors can access the OCHA-led www.HumanitarianResponse.info, which aims to be the key information management tool for operational responders during either a protracted or sudden-onset emergency. The UK-based Start Network has also established a Transforming Surge Capacity project, which aims to improve the capacity of humanitarian agencies to scale up resources in emergency response and brings together 11 operational INGOs and focuses on Asia. Of note, national governments of disaster-affected countries have also developed their own coordination systems, that often exist in parallel to the international systems, as was seen in the response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines[69].

[68] *The WFP Rapid Response Mechanism in South Sudan – One Year On, Results, Challenges and Way Forward* (May 2015); UNICEF Annual Report 2013 – Central African Republic (2013); http://www.unicef.org/about/annualreport/files/Central_African_Republic_COAR_2013.pdf

[69] IASC. (October 2014), *Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response.*

Annex D: Excerpts from the TOR for the Review[70]

Objectives of the review

1. A scoping of the humanitarian environment looking forward at least ten years (i.e. 2025), identifying changes to the environment and resulting disaster trends within which the global tools will operate and the needs they will seek to address.

2. A retrospective review of the global tools to date, identifying not only their strengths and weaknesses from both the individual technical / sectoral perspective but also that of their inter-dependencies and inter-operabilities and the decision-making framework within which they are deployed (or not), to give a current state

3. Determination of the **required** functionality of the global tools to meet the identified future needs

4. Testing the **required** functionality of the global tools: (*below refers to within the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement*)

a. Internally to ensure inter-dependencies and inter-operabilities are addressed
b. Internally to ensure required degrees of sustainability, particularly in terms of human resources and funding
c. Internally to ensure compatibility with, or flexibility for changes to the IFRC organisational structure, functions and the main prevailing policies (such as *Principles & Rules, Global DM SOPs and the Seville Agreement*)
d. Internally to ensure efficient use of resources at national, regional/zonal and global levels according to capacities and needs
e. Externally to ensure fit with the predicted future needs and emerging response approaches (such as the increasing use of cash / voucher programme approach)
f. Externally to ensure compatibility with other actors involved in the humanitarian environment, including other humanitarian agencies, civil, military and commercial entities
g. Externally to ensure linkages with external co-ordination bodies

5. A report of the gap analysis from **current** functionality to the **required** functionality to meet the identified future needs.

Production of the gap analysis report (GAR) will be used as the basis for the next stage (beyond this ToR). The GAR will include top-line recommendations to take the global tools from their current actual to the future desired functionality, as well as top-line recommendations (if any) for the support to, and the environment within which, the tools are deployed and operate. Note: these recommendations will reflect the discussions with the various

stakeholders consulted during the review but will not be reported as agreed by any of the stakeholders. The GAR will be the basis of reporting back on the progress of the GTR to the 20th General Assembly in December 2015

The GAR top-line recommendations will serve as a starting point for the next stage of the

[70] The entire TOR available on request

review (beyond this ToR) where the recommendations are considered, modified, adapted or rejected until they are accepted by all the stakeholders as agreed and their implementation plan (with timescales, milestones and budget) developed. This subsequent review, accepted recommendations, implementation plan and budget will form the basis of the final GTR report to be produced in late 2016

Phases of the review

Phase 0 - Draw inferences from (inter alia) the Philippines Haiyan real-time evaluation (RTE) and Nepal 2015 earthquake RTE (as well as the inclusion of selected information from the previous consultants' report) with focus on global tools deployed:

- The deployment process and environment within which they operated Evidence-based impact evaluation (as distinct from perceived impact)
- Reflection on lessons identified to model the theoretical ideal operational environment, decision-making and global tool composition

Phase I - Desk-based literature review of future humanitarian environment The final component will be an *interim GAR* outlining how the initial findings from Phase 0 match the findings of Phase I and an initial gap analysis between the global Production of the *interim GAR* represents a -Phase V will be determined at this stage.

Phase II – focus on nominal 'service delivery global tools, specifically FACT and ERUs

Phase III - focus on 'other' global tools, specifically RDRT, RIT, HEOps, HES, FERST, STT, SCT and other shelter cluster resources, RRUs and RDU

Phase IV - focus on the Federation environment and decision-making framework within which the global tools (all types) are deployed

Phase V - Development of consultative and agreed gap analysis (iv) and review report, which will inform the next phase of the process 46 agreeing recommendations and developing their implementation plan, timescale and budget.